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A DOMESTIC RIGHT OF RETURN?: RACE,
RIGHTS, AND RESIDENCY IN NEW
ORLEANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
HURRICANE KATRINA
LOLiTA BUCKNER INNISS*

Abstract: This article begins with a critical account of what occurred in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This critique serves as the backdrop
for a discussion of whether there are international laws or norms that give
poor, black Katrina victims the right to return to and resettle in New Orleans. In framing this discussion, this article first briefly explores some of
the housing deprivations suffered by Katrina survivors that have led to
widespread displacement and dispossession. The article then discusses
two of the chief barriers to the return of poor blacks to New Orleans: the
broad perception of a race-crime nexus and the general effect of the imposition of outsider status on poor, black people by dominant groups. Finally, the article explores the international law concept of the right of return and its expression as a domestic, internal norm via standards
addressing internally displaced persons, and considers how such a "domestic right of return" might be applicable to the Katrina victims.
"As a practicalmatter, these poorfolks don't have the resources to go back to
our city, just like they didn't have the resources to get out of our city."...
"So we won't get all those folks back. That's just a fact. It's not what I
want, it'sjust a fact."
-Joseph Canizaro, member of New Orleans's rebuilding
commission'

* © 2006, Lolita Buckner Inniss, Associate Professor, Cleveland Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University; A.B. Princeton University; J.D. University of California,

Los Angeles; LL.M., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Ph.D. Candidate, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University. The author thanks Professor Mitchell Crusto of Loyola
University, New Orleans; Professor Hope Lewis of Northeastern University Law School;
Associate Dean and Professor Kevin Johnson of the University of California, Davis; and
Professor Kathleen Engel of Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University,
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
' Peter Beaumont, Drowned City Cuts Its PoorAdrift, OBSERVER (London), Dec. 11, 2005,
at 24.
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INTRODUCTION

A. Gone with the Wind, and The Wind Done Gone 2 HurricaneKatrina and Its Aftermath

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a massive Category Four
storm, hit New Orleans, Louisiana and the surrounding Gulf Coast area
with a destructive wrath not felt in the area in decades. 3 Eighty percent
of New Orleans was flooded. 4 Some of the most severely damaged areas
of the city were the Lower Ninth Ward, Central City, and the Seventh
Ward, all areas heavily populated by African Americans. 5 In the wake of
2 See MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (Scribner 1996) (1936); ALICE

THE WIND DONE GONE (2001). This playful header to a very sobering topic recalls a 2001 book by Alice Randall called The Wind Done Gone and the controversy it generated. E.g., Nancy Pate, A Conversationwith Alice Randal ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 2001,
at El. Randall's book parodied Margaret Mitchell's iconic novel of the antebellum South,
Gone With the Wind. See MITCHELL, supra; RANDALL, supra. In her book Randall takes sharp
aim at the saccharine, hackneyed, and thoroughly racist mythology which characterized
Mitchell's book. See MITCHELL, supra; RANDALL, supra. In choosing this header, I am conRANDALL,

sciously "signifying." See

ANGELYN MITCHELL, THE FREEDOM TO REMEMBER: NARRATIVE,
SLAVERY, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY BLACK WOMEN'S FICTION 14 (2002). Signifying is

the act of "reversing, revising, or parodying another's speech or discourse." Id. Signifying is
verbal play that is often dual edged, being simultaneously obtuse and subtle. See HENRY
Louis GATES, JR., THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A THEORY OF AFRO-AMERICAN LITERARY
CRITICISM 80-81 (1988). Its purpose may be anything from didactic to critical to entertaining, and sometimes all three at once. Signifying may occur in various forms including
"repetition with a signal difference," "troping," or as "a metaphor for textual revision." See
GATES,JR., supra, at xxiv 81, 88.
s HurricaneKatrina Timeline CBC NEWS ONLINE (Can.), Sept. 4, 2005, http://www.cbc.
ca/news/background/katrina/katrina_timeline.html; see ERNEST ZEBROWSKI & JUDITH A.
HOWARD, CATEGORY 5: THE STORY OF CAMILLE,

LESSONS UNLEARNED

FROM AMERICA'S

MOST VIOLENT HURRICANE 234-36 (2005). Hurricane intensity is measured on the SaffirSimpson Hurricane Scale. ZEBROWSKI & HOWARD, supra, at 223-25. The scale ranges from
one to five, with a Category One hurricane being the least intense with wind speeds between 74 and 95 miles per hour, and a Category Five hurricane being the most intense
with wind speeds exceeding 155 miles per hour. Id. at 249-50. Hurricane Katrina was a
Category Four storm at 140 miles per hour. HurricaneKatrina Timeline, supra.
Prior to Katrina, the last storm to cause significant damage to New Orleans was Hurricane Betsy in 1965. See ZEBROWSKI & HOWARD, supra, at 47-50. However, no storm besides
Katrina has wielded such destructive force in the United States since the 1928 Okeechobee

Hurricane, which killed over 3000 people in Florida and Puerto Rico and many hundreds
more on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. See ELIOT KLEINBERG, BLACK CLOUD: THE
GREAT FLORIDA HURRICANE OF 1928, at xiv (2003). The Okeechobee Hurricane caused an
estimated $80 billion in damage in today's dollars. Id. at 225.
4

ROD AMIS, KATRINA AND THE LOST CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 32 (2005).

5 JOHN R. LOGAN, BROWN UNtv., THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORMDAMAGED NEIGHBORHOODS 11-12 tbl.3 (2006), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/ILatrina/report.pdf. New Orleans is divided into seventeen wards. Gordon Russell, Relatives Often
Inherit Assessors Powers, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 6, 2004, at 1. The Lower Ninth
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this destruction, many of these areas' residents, though forced out of
their homes, were unable to evacuate the city immediately due to a lack
of personal resources. 6 A number of residents were unable to leave
their homes at all, and the death toll ran high as some weathered the
storm on roof tops and in attics.7 Other residents sought safety in government-established shelters at the Louisiana Superdome and the New
Orleans Convention Center.8 Both refuges exhibited conditions often
seen only in developing countries or during times of war, as occupants
remained for days without adequate food, sanitation, or security.9 Stories of criminal activity in the shelters, both actual and apocryphal,
filled the airwaves. 10 Media outlets, many of their reporters often safely
Ward, prior to Hurricane Katrina, was approximately ninety-seven percent black. DOUGLAS
BRINKLEY, TIlE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI
GULF COAST 258 (2006). The Ninth Ward, located in the easternmost downriver portion of
the city is the largest and arguably most famous of these wards. See BRINKLEY, supra, at 25561; GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMT. DATA CTR., NEIGHBORHOODS IN ORLEANS PARISH (2004),
http://www.gnocdc.org/mapping/docs/Neighborhood.pdf
[hereinafter NEW ORLEANS
NEIGHBORHOOD MAP].

6 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 327-30. One commentator described the early departure
of those with "cars, money, and good health" as an example of how, in the days immediately preceding Hurricane Katrina, the strong (the well-to-do) failed to care for the weak
(those without resources). Id. at 328.
7 Id. at 163-64.
8 Id. at 275-76. According to Brinkley's account, by the Tuesday after the storm, the
Superdome held over 24,000 people. Id. at 275.
9
Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 457 (2006) (remarking that the media images in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina were, for many viewers, disquietly "third-worldish"). Yet
another observer described the images as evocative of either slavery or slave insurrection,
and suggested that they "triggered memories of Jim Crow injustice [s]" and other historic
inequalities suffered by African Americans. BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 329-30.
10Gary Younge, Murder and Rape-Fact or Fiction?, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 6, 2005,
at 5. Various media outlets reported that in the chaos at the New Orleans Superdome in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, two babies had their throats slit, a seven-year-old child
was raped and murdered, and several corpses were left among piles of excrement. Id.
None of these stories were ever substantiated. Id. Moreover, media attributions of crime
may in some cases have depended on whether the actor involved was white or black. See
Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture 94 CAL. L. REV. 907, 930-32
(2006) (reviewing MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY

(2003)); Gregory Kane, Two Photos Pose Puzzle: When Is It Not Loot-

ing?, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 3, 2005, at lB. In one well-publicized case, two photos were
shown on Yahoo News depicting persons in the aftermath of Katrina carrying food supplies. Harris, supra, at 930; Kane, supra. One of the photos showed a black person with the
caption: "A young man walks through chest deep waters after looting a grocery store in
New Orleans." Harris, supra, at 930. The other showed two white persons and was accompanied by the caption: "Two residents wade through chest-deep waters after finding bread
and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area." Id.
Succumbing to reader pressure, Yahoo later removed the photo depicting whites finding
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ensconced in the mostly white, relatively unaffected French Quarter of
New Orleans, chronicled the disaster.11
These news reports showed mainstream Americans, some of them
dubious about the continued existence of racial discrimination and increasingly reluctant to address it, a vision of American apartheid in the
new millennium. 12 Cameras scanning the shelters, which had quickly
deteriorated into little more than human warehouses, rarely showed a
white face. 1 3 Viewers watched with feelings ranging from stark horror to
horrid fascination the spectacle of masses of mostly black, mostly poor
people abandoned together in despair, filth, and chaos.' 4 One comfood but left the black "looter" along with the original caption. Makani Themba-Nixon,
Race, Racism and Media:Field Notes from the Frontlines, in TALKING THE WALK: A COMMUNICATIONS GUIDE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 5, 9 (Hunter Cutting & Makani Themba-Nixon eds.,
2006).
II Hunter Cutting & Makani Themba-Nixon, Katrina Coverage: Race in Your Face, in
TALKING THE WALK, supra note 10, at 118, 118; see also LOGAN, supra note 5, at 12 (noting

that the French Quarter was only 4.5% black and suffered minimal damage). As one
commentator observed, reporters for some media outlets often confined themselves to the
French Quarter in the aftermath of the storm and, as a result, initially reported that little
damage had been sustained in New Orleans overall. Cutting & Themba-Nixon, supra, at
118. It took two days for the mainstream press to fully recognize the scope of the disaster.
Id.
12John Powell, Foreword to TALKING THE WALK, supra note 10, at v (describing the media portrayal of the "American apartheid"). As one observer noted, "The recent devastation of Hurricane Katrina revealed the entrenched racial apartheid in America's cities."
Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Death in "Whiteface": Modern Race Minstrels, Official Lynching, and
the Culture of American Apartheid, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 150, 175 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,

2006).
13 SeeCutting & Themba-Nixon, supra note 11, at 118-21.
14 See id. Throughout this article I use the word "black" to refer to people who themselves originated in--or a significant number of whose ancestors originated from the continent of-Africa, and who embrace the social customs and norms associated with this
ancestry. Just what to call such persons has long been a subject of some debate. F. JAMES
DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK? 145-46 (1991). It has been suggested that the transition from "Negro" and "colored" to "black" and "African American" was a result of the efforts by persons
of African ancestry in the 1960s to achieve a sense of racial pride. Id. Ultimately, however,
the word "black," having become acceptable in public discourse, has remained as the most
popular choice in written accounts and conversation. See id. at 32. It has been estimated
that "African American" is used only one out of three times over "black" by blacks themselves, and even less often by non-blacks. Gina Philoghne, From Race to Culture: The Emergence of African American, in REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SOCIAL: BRIDGING THEORETICAL
TRADITIONS 113, 118 (Kay Deaux & Gina Philogine eds., 2001). One likely reason is the
relative brevity of the word black. I choose it for this reason and because I think that even
if "black" is not as historically or geographically defining as "African American," it is
equally or more culturally defining.
In this article I use the word "poor" to designate the economically disadvantaged, lowincome population. While I endeavor to use the word in a purely neutral, descriptive
sense, I recognize that it is a term fraught with "mischievous ambiguity." A. B. ATKINSON,
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mentator described the televised presentations of the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina and the squalor that many survivors faced as examples of "disaster pornography." 15 Some less sympathetic viewers likely
thought the spectacle evocative of the circles of Dante's Inferno, with
some commenting, both publicly and privately, that "those people" got
what they deserved. 16 When it was all over, in addition to the loss of
human life and individual property losses, there were communal
losses-large portions of neighborhoods that were the bedrock of black
New Orleans were all but washed away. 17 With the neighborhoods went

94 (1995) (quoting
the British Poor Law Report of 1834). It has been noted that for much of U.S. history the
word "poor" conjures two distinct images: the first of the "deserving" poor who lack the
ability to work, and the second of the "undeserving" or "unworthy" poor who are fully able
to provide for themselves but choose to exploit charity. CHRISTIE W. KIEFER, HEALTH
INCOMES AND THE WELFARE STATE: ESSAYS ON B~rrAIN AND EUROPE

WORK WIrH THE POOR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (2000). Kiefer defends neither image but

instead rejects the dichotomy, thus rejecting "the notion that poverty is essentially a matter
of personal responsibility." Id. Like Kiefer, I choose to reject the dichotomy, and in doing
so, I acknowledge the immense multidimensionality of poverty and the way in which it may
intersect with race, gender, or sexual orientation. See id.
15Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 437, 470 (2006). The phrase "disaster pornography"
has been used to describe the way in which victims suffering in disasters are dehumanized,
exploited, and reduced to objects of mass media consumption by sensationalized portrayals. See id. at 468-71. These accounts are characterized by excessive repetition, a focus on
the grotesque or the obscene, and a complete lack of nuance in reporting the actual problems of victims. See id.; see also Kenneth Hewitt, Excluded Perspectives in the Social Construction
of Disaster, in WHAT IS A DISASTER?: PERSPECTIVES ON THE QUESTION 75, 87 (E.L. Quaran-

telli ed., 1998). Compare the notion of "dismay of images," a phrase that describes the way
in which media portrayals of violence, crime, and disaster distort identity in face-to-face
relations. See Arthur Kleinman, The Violences of Everyday Life: The Multiple Forms and Dynamics of Social Violence, in VIOLENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY 226, 231-33 (Veena Das et al. eds.,

2000). Distortion occurs because such portrayals appropriate images of the victims, normalize suffering, turn empathetic viewers into voyeurs, and thereby alter the experience of
social suffering. See id. at 232.
16 See Carey Hamilton et al., When the Spotlight Fades, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Mar. 1,
2006, at Al. One commentator explained this attitude as follows: "Katrina victims are what
we've termed in social work circles the undeserving poor. The hurricane hits and they
become the symbol for how we focus our resources. They were in the headlines, and we
could see their poverty and their need." Id. (quoting MaryJane Taylor, Associate Professor
at the School of Social Work, University of Utah).
In Dante's Inferno, one of the three books of The Divine Comedy, Hell consists of nine
concentric descending circles, with each successive descending circle more gruesome or
harrowing than the previous one. See generally DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY

(Charles Eliot Norton trans., Encyclopedia Brittanica 1952) (1308-1321). The circles are
occupied by unrepentant sinners whose sins are punished in an ironic fashion-the sinner
is inflicted by the chief sin he or she committed for all of eternity. See id. See generally
W.H.V. READE, THE MORAL SYSTEM OF DANTE'S INFERNO (Kennikat Press 1969) (1909).

17 See discussion infra Part I.
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the people and the collective cultural life they infused into their own
neighborhoods and into the entire city of New Orleans.
Thousands of these poor, black New Orleanians were able to flee
their home city only after Hurricane Katrina had passed, when the
national and international spotlight sparked enough outrage to con18
vince local and federal authorities to provide some means of escape.
The reaction of national leaders to the crisis caused by Hurricane
Katrina was slow, causing many to excoriate the Bush administration
for its inadequate response.' 9 Newsweek published a cover photo showing a tearful black infant, a victim of Hurricane Katrina, with the caption "Poverty, Race & Katrina Lessons of a National Shame." 20 Rap
singer Kanye West declared during a nationally televised telethon for
hurricane victims that "George Bush doesn't care about black peo21
ple," sparking a maelstrom of responses, both critical and approving.
Those escaping the deluge and its aftermath were frequently labeled "refugees" by media reports.2 2 While these persons were not,
18 See WALTER M. BRASCH,
KATRINA 58-69 (2006).
19 See id. at 58-65.

'UNACCEPTABLE':

TIlE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE

20 NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005 (cover photograph).

21 Adrienne T. Washington, Op-Ed., Timidity No Answer to Racism in Katrina Debacle,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at B2. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in response

to West's remarks that, "Americans don't want to see Americans suffer. Nobody, especially
the president, would have left people unattended on the basis of race." Angela Rozas &
Howard Witt, The Dreadful Tol4 CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2005, § 1, at 1. Conversely, Scholar Michael Eric Dyson argued that Kanye West's comments suggested that "the government had
callously broken its compact with its poor black citizens, and that it had forgotten them
because it had not taken their pain to heart." MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH
WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER

28 (2006). However, perhaps

the most creative expression of approval of West's comments was a parodic rap written by
Houston rap group The Legendary K.O. THE LEGENDARY K.O., George Bush Doesn't Care
About Black People, on C.I.G.A.C. MIXTAPE (2005), available at http://www.k-otix.com/cigac/
komixtape.zip. The song, titled George Bush Doesn't CareAbout Black People, and sung to the
tune of Kanye West's hit single Gold Digger, is a powerful statement about the loss and powerlessness of poor, black Katrina victims. Id.; KANYE WEST, Gold Digger, on LATE REGISTRATION (Roc-a-Fella Records 2005). For a portion of the lyrics to the song, see Appendix A.
22 See HurricaneKatrina Turns 'Refugee' into Word of the Year, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at
C7. The word refugee was designated a word of the year by the Global Language Monitor, a

language-monitoring group. Id.; see also Top Word Lists of 2005, GLOBAL

LANGUAGE MONITOR,

Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.languagemonitor.com/Top-WordLists.html. The group pointed
to the political storm caused by the use of "refugee" to describe the hundreds of thousands of
people who fled Hurricane Katrina. HurricaneKatina Turns 'Refugee' into Word of the Year,
supra ("Global Language Monitor head PaulJ Payack said refugee, which was used five times
more often than other words to describe those made homeless by Katrina, triggered a debate
on race and political correctness."). As a result of complaints by storm victims and their advocates, a number of media oudets switched to the alternate term "evacuee." See Robert E.
Pierre & Paul Farhi, 'Refugee'. A Word of Trouble, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2005, at Cl.
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strictly speaking, refugees-generally defined as persecuted escapees
from often dysfunctional countries with no immediate prospect of
return-in many respects they were adrift and functionally stateless. 23
Some evacuees had never lived anywhere else and had no friends or
relations on whom to rely outside of their home city.24 A good num-

ber lost vital documents such as government identifications, birth certificates, and health insurance cards, and hence had great difficulty
securing services elsewhere hi the state or the country.25 Some were
the victims of scam artists who exploited the evacuees' lack of documents, often taking what few funds victims possessed in exchange for
worthless documentation. 26 Others fell prey to identity theft when
thieves gained access to the social security cards and other vital data
27
left behind by their victims in the haste of evacuation.
Those who were last to escape New Orleans often suffered the
brunt of the storm, were the least able to evacuate to other places, and
were often unwelcome in their new havens. Some towns and cities extended only a lukewarm welcome to the escapees. 28 Other towns,
though initially welcoming, soon developed "Katrina fatigue," or weariness with addressing the concerns of so many continuously needy people. 29 This was apparently the case in Houston, which probably received
the bulk of Katrina evacuees. 30 There, Rep. John Culberson (R-Tex.)
proposed "one-strike" legislation, which was directed at evacuees and
would make it possible to "deport" criminal offenders out of Houston
and back to their home cities. 3 1 The comments of this legislator reflected the widely held, though unsubstantiated, belief that Katrina
evacuees were largely responsible for Houston's upsurge in crime dur-

23

See id.

24 See David Ellison, A Tale of Two Cities, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 19, 2006, at Al.
25 See Alisa Marie DeMao, Katrina Evacuees Tangled in Red Tape, FLA. TIMES-UNION

(Jacksonville), Oct. 25, 2005, at BI; Jeb Phillips, Problems Following Evacuees up North, CoLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Sept. 23, 2005, at IA.
26 Michelle Hunter, Fake Driver's Licenses Fuel Arrests, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),

May 12, 2006, at 1 (reporting that evacuees purchased what turned out to be false driver's
licenses in order to secure services in the absence of actual identification documents).
27 Grant Schulte, Agencies Warn of Scam Artists, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 6, 2005, at 1.
28 See, e.g., Jeremy Alford, In One Parish, Divide over Sheltering Newcomers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2005, at A24.
29 See Katy Reckdahl, Desert Storm, PHOENIX NEw TIMESJuly 13, 2006.
30See Howard Witt, In Houston, Storm Brews on Evacuees, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 2006, § 1, at
3. Estimates are that over 100,000 Katrina evacuees remained in the Houston metropolitan
area as of September, 2006. Ellison, supra note 24.
31Witt, supra note 30.
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ing the months following the arrival of the evacuees. 32 At least one
town, apparently viewing the poor, black hurricane evacuees as malig33
nant debris left after the storm, actively refused to provide sanctuary.
Many of the Katrina evacuees will be, like actual refugees, permanently
in exile-they will have great difficulty returning to live in the New Orleans of the future.
B. Many Thousands Gone, PerhapsNever to Return

Poor, black New Orleans residents were frequently the last to escape during the evacuation. 34 They are now among the last to return to
New Orleans; in fact, many may never return.3 5 This delay in movement
is illustrated by analysis of the first U.S. Census Bureau data showing
the demographic impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the population of the Gulf Coast region.3 6 In the New Orleans metropolitan
area, the post-hurricane population was "more white, less poor, and
more transitory than the pre-hurricane population."3 7 It has been suggested that these changes were the result of the disproportionate
evacuation and slower return of lower-income and black residents from
the entire metropolitan area after the storms. 38 Moreover, researchers
32

See, e.g., Todd Bensman, Katrina Crime: Perceived or Real?, SAN

ANTONIO EXPRESS-

NEWS, Oct. 29, 2006, at 1A Peggy O'Hare, Which Came First-The Evacuees or the Crime?,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 22, 2006, at B1.
33 See 60 Minutes: The Bridge to Gretna (CBS television broadcast Dec. 18, 2005) (transcript available on LEXIS, follow News & Business, Combined Sources, Transcripts).
Armed police from the town of Gretna, Louisiana, which is just over the Mississippi River
from New Orleans, blocked the only connecting route, a bridge called the Crescent City
Connection, when hundreds of Katrina evacuees tried to cross on foot in the aftermath of
the storm. Id. Town officials argued that they were trying to protect the town. Id. Mayor
Ronnie Harris of Gretna, in response to criticism of the town's behavior, allegedly stated,
'This [Hurricane Katrina] was not a 9/11 tragedy with good-heartedness all around. You
had anarchy and civil disobedience." Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm: Hearing
Before the H. Select BipartisanComm. to Investigate the Preparationfor and Response to Hurricane
Katrina, 109th Cong. (2005) (opening statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, H. Select
Katrina Response Investigation Comm.).
3 See BRASCH, supra notel8, at 9. Many poor and working class people, the majority of
whom were black, were the last to leave New Orleans chiefly because they had no resources
to leave. Id. Some resisted leaving in order to safeguard their possessions. Id.; Lou Dobbs
Tonight: Crisis in Louisiana (CNN television broadcast Sept. 8, 2005) (rush transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/08/ldt.0l.htm).
35 LOGAN, supra note 5, at 1.
36 WILLIAM

H.

FREY

&

AUDREY

SINGER,

BROOKINGS INST.,

ON GULF COAST POPULATIONS: FIRST CENSUS FINDINGS 8-11

brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060607_hurricanes.pdf.
37 Id. at 8.
38 Id. at 9, 11.

KATRINA AND

RITA IMPACTS

(2006), availableat http://www.
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from Brown University have found that if these overwhelmingly poor,
mostly black evacuees are prevented from returning to their own
neighborhoods, New Orleans stands to lose approximately eighty per39
cent of its black population.
There are a number of explanations for why poor, black Katrina
victims failed to return to New Orleans. First, a lack of personal financial
resources may have prevented many evacuees from returning.4° Additionally, many evacuees face difficult housing-related barriers. Some of
the storm victims were the owners of uninsured or underinsured
houses, and thus have insufficient funds to repair or replace damaged
homes. 41 Others were the owners of only marginally damaged houses

that have been slated for demolition by city authorities who have made
little, if any, effort to contact owners. 42 Some storm victims were the occupants of public housing that, whether reparable or not, has been
slated for demolition or renovation. 43 These former public housing occupants have, for the most part, been offered no meaningful alternate
housing. 44 Still others have been evicted from fully functioning, pris9 LOGAN, supra note 5, at 1; Ross Frazier, New Orleans Could Lose 80 Percent of Black
Population,Brown Study Finds, BROWN UNIV. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 2, 2006, at 1.
40 See, e.g., Beaumont, supra note 1; Allan Turner & Eric Berger, Report: Storms Left New
Human Landscape, HOUSTON CHRON.COM, June 7, 2006, http://chron.com/disp/story.mpl.
hurricane/3945689.html.
41See discussion infra Part II.A.
42 The limited efforts of New Orleans authorities to contact homeowners of the demolition list was documented by a number of entities, among them law students at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law School who volunteered to assist storm
victims in 2005 and 2006. See, e.g., Audio tape: Panel Discussion, Critical Race Praxis: Reports on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction from the Gulf Coast, at Western Law Professors
of Color Conference, Pale Promises: Confronting the Rights Deficit (Mar. 31, 2006) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Panel Discussion on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction]. One
student commented about the insistence of the city of New Orleans that it had made a
good faith effort to reach many of the owners of homes slated for demolition. Id. (comments of Panelist Priscilla Ocen, Student Member of the Critical Race Theory Program,
UCLA Law School). In the course of a few days' work, using standard search tools such as
the Internet, the students had located a number of previously "lost" homeowners. Id.
43 NBC Nightly News: New Orleans Residents File Lawsuit to Block Demolition of Public Housing Complexes Damaged by HurricaneKatrina (NBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2006) (transcript available on LEXIS, follow News & Business, Combined Sources, Transcripts).
"See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages at
2-3, Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298 (E.D. La. June 27, 2006), 2006 WL 2032744. On
June 27, 2006, former residents of public housing in New Orleans filed a lawsuit alleging
that a federal plan to demolish four public housing complexes in New Orleans was discriminatory and violated international laws that protect people displaced by natural disasters. Id. at 25-31. The suit was filed by several residents against the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing Authority of New Orleans,
which was effectively taken over by HUD four years ago. Id. at 7, 16-17.
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vately owned housing units that served the working poor and lower
middle class before the hurricane. 45 Those housing units, like much of
the housing available in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, are in
high demand and thus are being re-rented at often significantly higher
rates. 46 Finally, the lack of housing is exacerbated by the desire of local
authorities to build a "new, improved New Orleans" that excludes "undesirables," that is, poor, black people. 47 As a result, large numbers of
New Orleans's poor blacks are not likely to resume residency in the city.
In the face of so many obstacles to the return of much of New Orleans's black community, a fundamental inquiry arises-what is the recourse for persons facing housing loss impeding their ability to return
home? While there are some standard legal remedies for individuals
facing displacement, the question concerns not just the harms to individual housing rights created in the wake of Hurricane Katrina but also
harms to the evacuees' right to live where they, and in many cases generations of their families, have lived for many years.48 Long-term residency imbues a sense of place involving individual as well as collective
or communal rights.

49

Many of the poor blacks evacuated from New

Orleans occupied some of the longest-standing and most vibrant black
communities in the United States. Is there a right to return to and resettle these places, and if not, should there be?
Generally, U.S. law provides no explicit right of return for persons
who are displaced internally, meaning within the country.50 Although
the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of movement and the right to
travel, there is no explicit right to return to a previous place of habitation, nor has such a right been held to flow from any articulated consti45 Sacha Pfeiffer, Landlord with Boston Ties Lashed for KatrinaEvictions, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 29, 2006, at Al.
Id.
47 See discussion infra Part fI.B.
46

4 The black community in New Orleans has a long history dating back to antebellum
New Orleans's large, influential, and propertied free black-or libre--population, which
was unique in the South. See generally KIMBERLY S. HANGER, BOUNDED LIVES, BOUNDED
PLACES: FREE BLACK SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NEW ORLEANS, 1769-1803 (1997).
49 See Nadia Lovell, Introduction to LOCALITY AND BELONGING 1, 1-2 (Nadia Lovell ed.,
1998). Some individuals' sense of belonging arises from not only the individual memory,
but also the collective memory associated with a place. Id. at 4. Several sources provide a
discussion of the politics of the placement and displacement of particular social groups. See
Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low, Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry, in PLACE ArACHMENT 1, 1-12 (Irwin Altman & Setha M. Low eds., 1992) (providing an overview of previous research regarding the characteristics, sources, and roles of place attachment from a
multi-disciplinary point of view). See generally SUZAN ILCAN, LONGING IN BELONGING: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF SErrLEMENT (2002).
50 See discussion infra Parts IV.C, V.
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tutional right.5 1 Given this void in U.S. domestic law, I turn to international law to find support for a domestic right of return.
C. What This Article Is About

I began this article with a critical account of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This critique serves as the backdrop for a discussion of
the extent to which there are international laws or norms that give
poor, black Katrina victims, both as individuals and community members, the right to return to and resettle their historical place. 52 This article is framed by a discussion of the neighborhoods that were destroyed and an exploration of some housing deprivations suffered by
Katrina survivors that have led to widespread displacement and dispossession. Thereafter the article discusses two of the chief barriers to the
return of poor blacks to New Orleans: the broad perception of a racecrime nexus and the effect of the imposition of outsider status on poor,
black people. Turning to remedies for the dispossession, I explore the
international law concept of the right of return and its expression as a
domestic, internal norm and consider how it might be applicable to the
Katrina victims. While this article considers only the contours of this
complex and multifaceted issue, it is clear that its significance merits
further analysis by both theorists and practitioners. Undoubtedly, a
right of return would help the poor, black former inhabitants of New
Orleans become a part of their city once more.

51 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966) (Harlan, J. concurring) ("[T] he
right of ingress and regress ... is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship under
the Constitution." (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825)
(No. 3230))); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding that, under the Fifth
Amendment, a citizen cannot be deprived of the right to travel without due process of
law). The right to domestic travel is said to have three separate components in the United
States: "the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another State, the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien ... and, for those travelers who
elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
State." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-03 (1999).
52 Blacks were by no means the only community of color to suffer in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. See generally BRENDA Mu iz,

NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, IN THE EVE

How THE GOvERNMENT AND PRIVATE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
FAILED LATINOS (2006), available at http://www.ncr.org/files/36812fileWPKatrinaFNL
OF THE STORM:

fnl.pdf. Katrina had a devastating impact on the Latino community for two reasons. See id.
at 4-7, 11. The few sources of relief which were made available during and after the storm
were sometimes inaccessible to Latinos due to language barriers. See id. at 11. In addition,
Latino immigrants, both documented and undocumented, were frequently excluded from

receiving benefits due to uncertainty about their eligibility. See id. at 4-7.
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I. THE WAY THEY WERE: NEW ORLEANS'S HISTORIC BLACK
NEIGHBORHOODS

"I don't care what people are saying Uptown or wherever they are. This city
will be chocolate at the end of the day.... This city will be a majority Afican-American city. It's the way God wants it to be."

-New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin 53
A. The Lower Ninth Ward

New Orleans, despite being subject to the South's stringent social
codes separating blacks from whites in most avenues of life, was relatively
integrated in the period before the U.S. Civil War.5 4 This social liberality
ended, however, with the onset of Jim Crow laws. 55 The racial division

originating during this period resulted in the growth of largely black
neighborhoods. 56 Though a number of these primarily black areas sustained significant damage during Hurricane Katrina and in the storm
that came less than a month later, Hurricane Rita, the best known of the
57
black neighborhoods was the Lower Ninth Ward.

The Lower Ninth Ward, often called Lower Nine by New Orleanians, consists of the portion of the Ninth Ward that runs along the
Mississippi River downriver from the Industrial Canal and stretching to
the parish of St. Bernard. 58 The Lower Ninth Ward has long been known
for its high number of working-class African American homeowners. 59
However, though much of New Orleans dates back to the eighteenth
century, the Lower Ninth Ward was one of the last sections of the city to
5

3John Pope, Evoking King, Nagin Calls NO. 'Chocolate' City, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),Jan. 17, 2006, at 1.
54See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainageand EnvironmentalEquity in New
Orleans, 1890-1930, 28J. HIST. GEOGRAPnY 237, 241 (2002) (citing Roger A. Fischer, Racial
Segregation in Ante Bellum New Orleans, 74 As,. HIST. REv. 926 (1969), H.W. Gilmore, The Old
New Orleans and the New: A Case for Ecology, 9 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 385 (1944), and
Daphne Spain, Race Relations and Residential Segregation in New Orleans: Two Centuries of
Paradox,ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScL,Jan. 1979, at 82).
55 Id.
56 See id. at 239-41; Juliette Landphair, Sewerage, Sidewalks, and Schools: The New Orleans
Ninth Ward and PublicSchool Desegregation, LA. HIST., Winter 1999, at 35, 40-41.
57 See Beaumont, supra note 1.
58 See NEW ORLEANS NEIGHBORHOOD MAP, supra note 5; see also AMIs, supra note 4, at
45; Landphair, supranote 56, at 38-39.
59Susan J. Popkin et al., Rebuilding Affordable Housing in New Orleans: The Challenge of Creating Inclusive Communities, in URBAN INST., AFTER KATRINA: REBUILDING OPPORTUNITY AND
EQurrY INTO THE NEW NEW ORLEANS 17, 18-19 (Margery Austin Turner & Sheila R.
Zedlewski eds., 2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311406_afterkatrina.pdf.
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be developed. 60 The area's poor drainage and relative isolation from the
rest of the city explains its late development. 61 The Lower Ninth Ward
was created from a cypress swamp, and initially was populated by poor
blacks and irmnigrant whites unable to afford housing in other sections
of New Orleans.

62

Some black families date their presence in the area to

the 1870s, when a number of African American benevolent associations
and mutual-aid societies organized to provide support for the large
numbers of freedmen whose recent condition of servitude had left them
few resources to live on their own. 63 From their earliest presence in the

Lower Ninth Ward, self-help became the watchword for African American families as municipal authorities all but ignored the area's residents.

64

By the early 1920s, a significant portion of the Lower Ninth Ward's
residents were black, and they remained underserved by public officials. 65 For example, despite much of the wealth generated throughout

New Orleans in the early twentieth century, eighty-six percent of the
streets in the Lower Ninth Ward remained unpaved as late as the
1960s. 66 For much of its history, the area also lacked proper drainage

and sewers; a number of homes still used outhouses and poorly installed septic tanks.67 In September 1965, Hurricane Betsy exacerbated
these problems; Betsy killed sixty-five people in New Orleans, with its
most devastating effects felt in the Lower Ninth, much of which was left
underwater.68 However, despite its limited resources, the Lower Ninth
Ward was a vibrant neighborhood characterized by an independent
"can-do" attitude that developed in response to governmental neglect. 69
Even in the face of persistent poverty in some areas, by the time Hurricane Katrina hit, sixty percent of the homes in the area were owner70
occupied.
60 Amis,

supra note 4, at 64.

61 See id.
62 Id.

Id.; Landphair, supra note 56, at 35, 36-37, 40.
See CRAIG E. COLTEN, AN UNNATURAL METROPOLIS: WRESTING NEW ORLEANS FROM
NATURE 114 (2005); Landphair, supra note 56, at 40-41.
65 E.g., COLTEN, supra note 64, at 97-98, 114.
66 Kent B. Germany, "They Can Be Like Other People": Race, Poverty, and the Politics of
Alienation in New Orleans'sEarly Great Society, in THE NEW DEAL AND BEYOND: SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE SOUTH SINCE 1930, at 163, 166-67, 170 (Elna C. Green ed., 2003).
67 COLTEN, supra note 64, at 100; Landphair, supra note 56, at 35.
68 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 59; see COLTEN, supra note 64, at 145-46, 154.
69 See Nicolai Ouroussoff, In New Orleans, Each Resident Is Master of Plan to Rebuild, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at El; Landphair, supra note 56, at 37, 41, 44.
6

64

70

Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 19.
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed or heavily damaged the vast
majority of the Lower Ninth Ward's housing. 71 Mandatory evacuations
of New Orleans resulted in the displacement of a large number of residents, with many unable to return to their homes or even to New Orleans proper.72 Piles of debris, untreated water, lack of electricity, insufficient housing, and limited public educational facilities and other
services are only some of the problems that caused and are still causing
the prolonged absence of former residents. 73 The destruction of the
Lower Ninth Ward meant the loss of more than just individual homes
and businesses; it was the death of a vital institution. The Lower Ninth
Ward was not, however, the only predominantly black section of New
Orleans to experience such overwhelming loss. 74 Two other areas, the
75
Central City and the Seventh Ward were also hard hit.
B. Other PredominantlyBlack Areas SustainingDamage:
The Central City and the Seventh Ward
The Central City is a section of New Orleans located just above
the central business district. 76 The section was first developed in the
1830s and was initially populated by working-class European, mostly
Irish and Jewish, immigrants. 77 Much like the Lower Ninth Ward, the
Central City is located in a basin so far below sea level that it has long
been considered marginal land.7 8 Despite being geographically illfavored, the central business district contained theaters, music companies, and publishing houses that were part of a mainstream enter79
tainment industry in the early twentieth century.
The Seventh Ward, located near downtown New Orleans and extending from Esplanade Avenue to Elysian Fields, is one of the lesserknown areas of New Orleans yet one of the hardest hit by flooding fol-

71 LOGAN, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.3 (indicating that 99.9% of the Lower Ninth Ward was
damaged).
72 See id. at 1 ("[I]f nobody [is] able to return to damaged neighborhoods ... New Orleans is at risk of losing more than 80% of its black population.").
73 Ean Thomas et al., New Orleans Blues, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 2006, at 28, 29.
74 See discussion infra Part I.B.
75 See discussion infra Part I.B.
76 See NEW ORLEANS NEIGHBORHOOD MAP, supra note 5.
77 See COLTEN, supra note 64, at 91; ROBERT N. ROSEN, THE JEWISH CONFEDERATES 25
(2000).
78 See COLTEN, supra note 64, at 82-83.
79 See Greater New Orleans Cmty. Data Ctr., Central Business District Neighborhood
Snapshot, http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/1 /47/snapshot.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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lowing Hurricane Katrina. 80 Throughout much of its early history, the

Seventh Ward was home to Creoles--a term which, when employed in
the context of New Orleans, refers to persons of mixed black and white
ancestry.8 1 Like the Ninth Ward, it was a long-underserved section of
the city, plagued by poor sewage, poor drainage, overpopulation, and
frequent attempts by city government to curtail the autonomy of the
residents. 82 Nonetheless, almost since the founding of New Orleans, the
Seventh Ward Creoles formed their own discrete social group with distinctive cuisine and culture. 83 Moreover, a number of the city's best
known musicians, artists and craftsmen made their homes in the Seventh Ward. 84 One of the nation's most prosperous black business districts, the Claiborne Avenue neighborhood, was partly located in the
85
Seventh Ward.

In the late 1960s, the business district along Claiborne Avenue was
destroyed to allow for the new Interstate 10 loop.8 6 The destruction of a
large swath of the Ward for the interstate's construction undermined
the integrity of the neighborhood. 87 While this caused some homeowners to move or abandon their homes, the neighborhood continued to
house various groups of professionals, including skilled laborers such as
mechanics, carpenters, and bricklayers.8 8 More recently, the Seventh
Ward was home to publicly funded housing complexes including St.
Bernard, the largest of New Orleans's housing complexes. 89

80
81

See LOGAN, supranote 5, at 11 tbl.3; NEW ORLEANS NEIGHBORHOOD MAP, supra note 5.
See VIRGINIA

R.

DOMiNGUEZ,

WHITE

BY

DEFINrrION:

SOCIAL

CLASSIFICATION

IN

CREOLE LOUISIANA 122 (1986); see also Alice Moore Dunbar-Nelson, People of Color in Louisiana (pt.1), IJ. NEGRO HIST. 361 (1916), reprinted in CREOLE: THE HISTORY AND LEGACY
OF LOUISIANA'S FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR

3, 8-9 (Sybil Klein ed., 2000).

COLTEN, supra note 64, at 91, 95, 96.
83 DOMiNGUEZ, supra note 81, at 125-27.
84 A number of well-known and lesser-known but highly esteemed jazz musicians of African ancestry made their homes in the Seventh Ward, among them Ferdinand "Jelly Roll"
Morton, often cited as the "inventor" of jazz. ALAN LOMAX, MISTER JELLY ROLL: THE FOR82

TUNES OF JELLY ROLL MORTON, NEW ORLEANS CREOLE AND "INVENTOR OF JAZZ," at xii, xiv,

70-71 (Random House 1993) (1949).
8 Tim Wise, Progress and the Eye of the Beholder: Reflections on Race, Class and Truth, BLACK
COMMENTATOR,

July 6, 2006, http://www.blackcomrnentator.com/190/190_progress-be-

holderwisethink_pf.html.
86 Id. A recent proposal is slated to replace Claiborne Avenue in order to recreate
some of the black-owned businesses that once thrived there. See Ouroussoff, supra note 69.
87
Wise, supra note 85.
88 DOMiNGUEZ, supra note 81, at 253-55; Wise, supra note 85.

8 Bill Sasser, Locking out New Orleans' Poor, SALON.COM, June 12, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/06/12/nola-housing/index.html.
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The Lower Ninth Ward, the Central City, and the Seventh Ward all
faced crippling loss in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The suffering continues even now, long after the storm, as those affected must
still deal with displacement and dispossession.
II.

REASONS FOR THE DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION OF POOR,
BLACK NEW ORLEANIANS

"Wiether we like it or not, New Orleans is not going to be 500,000 people
for a long time.... New Orleans is not going to be as black as it was for a
long time, if ever again. "
-Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson9"
A. Voyage of the Undammed: The Plight of the Uninsured
and the Underinsured

Many homes in the range of the storm, and virtually all of those
that were mortgaged, had homeowner's insurance coverage. 9 1 Nonetheless, a number of poor, black Katrina survivors owning real property
found themselves in a difficult position in the aftermath of the storm.
One reason for this is that a number of low-income homeowners, having owned their homes long enough to pay off mortgages, were under
no obligation to purchase either standard homeowner's insurance or
flood insurance; thus, many did not.92 For these uninsured homeown-

ers, the only recourse against Katrina damage was to hope for government assistance, which in many cases has been slow in arriving. 93 Even
in cases where the homeowners had insurance policies, the payouts

90 Beaumont, supra note 1.
91 Cf MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 & n.14 (2003) (assuming, for purposes of analyzing demand in
the market for homeowners insurance, that "homeowners insurance... is essentially mandatory"). Mortgage lenders generally require homeowners to purchase and keep in effect
a policy of homeowner's insurance prior to closing on the loan. See id. at 108; Popkin et al.,
supra note 59, at 18-19. The lender is named as sole or co-loss payee along with the borrower. See Mary L. Burgner, Assisting Clients in Achieving the American Dream, MICH. Bus. J.,
Jan. 1996, at 44, 46-47. In many cases, the lender collects funds from the mortgagor and
maintains them in an escrow account in order to make the payments to the insurer, thus
ensuring compliance with the insurance requirement. See id. at 45-47.
92 See Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 18, 19.
93 Richard Wolf, New Orleans Symbolizes U.S. War on Poverty, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 2006,
at A13 ("Since Hurricane Katrina struck on Aug. 29, 2005, only 94 homeowners-and no
tenants-have received federal aid to rebuild.").
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from insurance companies have also been delayed and insufficient for
94
full recovery, particularly in the case of black claimants.
Many insurers denied claims made under valid homeowner's policies for losses caused by Hurricane Katrina, arguing that the losses were
caused by flooding resulting from the levee breach and not the hurricane itself.95 While standard homeowner's policies often cover wind

and rain, flooding and associated perils are generally excluded from
such policies and may only be addressed under flood insurance policies. 96 Nonetheless, several lawsuits have been filed to force insurers to
cover some Katrina losses under standard homeowner's polices. In
some cases, such suits argue the doctrine of "efficient proximate cause,"
which provides that if a covered peril causes an excluded peril, coverage is available even for the damage caused by the excluded peril. 97 Accordingly, if high winds, an included peril under many policies, caused
flooding, then such flooding would be covered. 98 Efficient proximate
cause has been the basis of successful claims by the insured in a number of jurisdictions, including Louisiana. 99 Because of the doctrine's

94 Rukmini Callimachi & Frank Bass, Complaints About Insurance Can Pay Off HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 26, 2006, at 3. There is evidence to suggest that residents of black areas who
actually had insurance and who filed claims under those policies are not being served in
the same manner as their counterparts in white neighborhoods. Id. An analysis performed
by the Associated Press (AP) showed that although more than 8000 Louisiana residents
have filed Katrina-related complaints with the state insurance office, almost seventy-five
percent of the 3000 insurance cases settled in Louisiana in the first year after Katrina were
filed by residents currently living in predominantly white areas. Id. Claims filed by households in majority-black zip codes represented only twenty-five percent of settled claims. Id.
As a result of the slow response from insurance companies, a number of black claimants
have given up and accepted amounts representing, in some cases, only a fraction of their
original claims. Id. The AP analysis also showed that "residents living in white neighborhoods have been three times as likely as homeowners in black areas to seek state help in
resolving insurance disputes." Id.
95 Mitchell F. Crusto, The KatrinaFund: RepainngBreaches in Gulf Coast InsuranceLevees,
43 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 329, 330-31, 333-34 (2006).
96 Id. at 334-35. At least one major insurer is seeking to exempt wind and hail from its
standard homeowners policies in hurricane-prone sections of Louisiana. Mike Hasten,
Allstate Threatens to Pull out of State, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La.),July 22, 2006, at lA. Allstate,
the state's second largest insurer, threatened to cancel its 30,000 homeowners insurance
policies with customers in eighteen coastal Louisiana parishes if the state did not allow it to
make the changes it sought. Id. For a discussion of excluded perils, see generally Crusto,
supra note 95.
97 For a further discussion of the doctrine of efficient proximate cause, see Crusto, supro note 95, at 343-44.

9 See id.
9 Id. at 344 (citing Assurance Co. of Am. v. Jay-Mar, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354
(D.N.J. 1999) and Rhoden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 907, 912 (S.D.
Miss. 1998)).
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success, many insurers had inserted "anti-concurrent causation clauses"
in their policies, chiefly in response to paying large numbers of claims
from the devastation of Hurricane Camille in 1969.100 Notwithstanding
insurers' efforts to limit the application of efficient proximate cause, a
number of lawsuits have been filed by homeowners seeking such coverage. 10 1 These suits have been met with limited success.10 2 In one such
suit, plaintiff Trent Lott, the U.S. Senator from Mississippi, was denied
coverage under a standard homeowner's policy. As a result of the de03
nial, Senator Lott filed suit and the insurer moved to dismiss.
Though Senator Lott prevailed, the matter continues in litigation. Another legislator, Representative Gene Taylor, a Democrat from Missis10 4
sippi, has also filed suit after being denied coverage by an insurer.

100 Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, NAT. RE& ENV'T, Spring 2006, at 26, 27. "Anti-concurrent causation clauses provide that
the insurer will not pay if one of the causes was an excluded loss, even if there are several
enumerated causes that played a role in a loss." Crusto, supra note 95, at 344.
101 See, e.g., Tuepker v.State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 05-CV-559-LTS-JMR, 2006 WL
1442489, at *3 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006) (noting plaintiff's allegation that wind was the
proximate cause of damage to their property in Hurricane Katrina); Buente v. Allstate
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-712-LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 980784, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 12,
2006) (noting plaintiff's allegation that storm surge was the cause of damage to their
property in Hurricane Katrina and that storm surge was not an excluded peril). Homeowners in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes commenced a class action against the Louisiana
Insurance Commissioner and numerous insurers to obtain a declaration that the flooding
was dominantly and efficiently caused by levee breaches and thus by negligence and windstorm, not by the flood exclusion. Class Action Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Mandamus at 3-6, Chehardy v. Wooley, No. 536451 (La.Jud. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 2005), 2005
La. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 5, at *4-8, *9-10.
102 Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.1:06CV001 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (Mem.), avail(deable at http://www.mssd.uscourts.gov/Insurance%200pinions/chO6cvlorderAO322.pdf
nying certification of a class in a suit against State Farm brought by policyholders whose
claims were rejected following Hurricane Katrina).
103 See Lott v.State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05-CV-671-LTS-RH, 2006 WL 2728695 at
*1 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2006). In response, in June 2006, Senator Lott and Senator Mark
Dayton, a Democrat from Minnesota, proposed a bill, colloquially termed "Honesty is the
Best Insurance Policy," which would require the language of insurance policies to be in
plain English. Uniform Insurance Non-Coverage Disclosure Act, S.3239, 109th Cong. § 2
(2006); Nomi Prins, Op-Ed., Don't Let Insurers Shirk Responsibility, NEWSDA" (N.Y.), Aug. 30,
2006, at A33. Though the coverage problem was widespread and has caused many to file
suit against insurers, some have speculated that because the insurance industry is one of
the biggest donors to politicians' coffers, there is little support in Congress for any change
that would harm the interests of insurers. Ana Radelat, Congress Unlikely to Help in Insurance
Fights, GANNETr NEWS SERV., Sept. 6, 2006 (on file with author).
104 Ana Radelat, Congress Targets Katrina Claims, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.),Jan.
19, 2007, at lA. Taylor is also chair of the House Democratic Caucus Hurricane Katrina
Task Force, which advocates a number of proposals, among them "ending the insurance
industry's limited antitrust exemption" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, "requiring
homeowners' policies to cover all perils, and creating a federal regulator to provide overSOURCES
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Separate flood polices are offered either by private insurers or,
more often, by the government in markets that face extreme flood
risk. 10 5 In 1968 Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in response to the rising cost of taxpayer-funded disaster
relief for flood victims and the increasing amount of damage caused by
floods. 0 6 The NFIP makes federally backed flood insurance available in
communities that agree to adopt and enforce floodplain management
ordinances to reduce future flood damage. 10 7 A large number of policies made available through the NFIP are administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a unit of the Department of
Homeland Security.10 8 Only owners in participating communities may
purchase coverage, and generally this participation is based on an
agreement between the local community and the federal government.1 0 9 Because flood insurance is largely unavailable in standard

homeowner's policies, the NFIP, which sells policies directly or through
individual agents, assumes all risk of damages in the case of a flood. 110
Notwithstanding government backing, flood insurance policies
are often among the most expensive types of insurance offered to
homeowners.]1 The exorbitant cost of such policies means that many

sight of the industry." House Democrats' Katrina Panel Calls for Federal Insurance Oversight,
BESTWIRE, Oct. 20, 2006 (on File with author). For a broad discussion of the homeowner's
insurance problems faced by Hurricane Katrina victims, see generally Crusto, supra note
95.
105 See generally Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program: A U.S. Approach to Flood Loss Reduction, in FLOOD ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY WATER MANAGEMENT
185, 185-86 (Jiri Marsalek et al. eds., 2000).
106 Id. at 185. For a broad discussion of the impact of the NFIP, see generally Raymond
J. Burby, HurricaneKatrinaand the Paradoxesof Government DisasterPolicy: BringingAbout Wise
GovernmentalDecisionsfor HazardousAreas, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sct., Mar. 2006,
at 171.
107 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (FEMA), ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 1 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/library/
viewRecord.do?id=1404 (follow "View/Download/Print" hyperlink to access PDF file).
108 Id. at 1-2.
109 See id. at 9; Mark A. Riebau, The Importance of Maps for Floodplain Management and
Flood Insurance, in FLOOD ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY WATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 105,
at 167, 168.
110 FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL: GENERAL RULES, at GR-1 to GR-2 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual
200610/03gr.pdf; see also Pasterick, supra note 105, at 189-90; Riebau, supra note 109, at
11l.S
I For a discussion of the allocation of flood risk and the cost of such coverage, see
Robert Rhee, CatastrophicRisk and GovernanceAfter HurricaneKatrina:A Postscriptto Terrorism
Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 581, 597-600 (2007).
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homeowners choose to forgo flood coverage. 112 It has been reported
that roughly half the damaged properties in Louisiana were covered
by flood insurance.11 3 A large number of poor, black New Orleanians
were among those lacking flood insurance.1 14 Moreover, another significant factor in the lack of flood insurance in the heavily African
American Ninth Ward is that, prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had
termed much of the Lower Ninth Ward "low risk" because it was located on relatively high ground and was expected to be protected by
the levees. 115 In summary, many poor, black New Orleanians have
been unable to recover and rebuild because they are either uninsured
or, if they carry insurance at all, have insufficient coverage.
B. The Threat of Wrongful Demolition
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a
number of the homes owned or occupied by evacuees were marked as
nuisances by the city and slated for demolition. 116 Demolition by local
authorities in such circumstances is permitted under the general police
power granted to states. 117 However, in order for governmental authori18
ties to act and demolish a structure, there must in fact be a nuisance.1
Owners of properties destroyed as nuisances are not granted compensation for those properties, as owners of properties taken for public use
are. 119 Yet owners may contest the finding of nuisance in cases of pend1 2°
ing demolition through a public hearing, after proper notice is given.
112 SeeJonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The ContinuingStorm: How DisasterRecovery
Excludes Those M~ost in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 28-29 (2006) ("[Gliven their financial
constraints, many elderly, fixed-income, and low-income households simply do not purchase or maintain insurance.").
11 E.g., When GovernmentFails-KatyinasAfermat, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 25, 28.
114 See Hooks & Miller, supra note 112, at 34-35.
115 Popkin et al., supra note 59, at 19.
6
1 Joe Gyan, Jr., N.O. Officials Promise Not to Seize Property, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge,
La.), Aug. 4, 2006, at Al.
117See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 2001);James v. City of Dallas, No. 3:98-CV-436-R, 2003 WL 22342799, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2003), aff'd 115 F.
App'x 205 (5th Cir. 2004).
11s See Freeman, 242 F.3d at 652-53 ("[A] city may not arbitrarily enter abatement orders or declare the existence of nuisances with no underlying standards.").
119 See Willard v.City of Eugene, 550 P.2d 457, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). Actions for
wrongful demolition or actions to enjoin such acts by a governmental entity are distinct
from actions for inverse condemnation. See id. at 460 (denying plaintiffs inverse condemnation claim but implying that the facts of the case may have been sufficient to prove the
tort of wrongful demolition). An action for wrongful demolition typically contests a finding by governmental authorities that a property is a nuisance and seeks damages for the
removal or destruction of the edifice. In contrast, an inverse condemnation claim requires
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The issue of notice creates the major problem for poor, black New
Orleanian homeowners. As a group of law students from the University
of California at Los Angeles reported, New Orleans officials very often
indicated that houses were set for destruction by physically marking
them with fluorescent paint or by publishing details in local newspapers
and referencing GPS coordinates instead of addresses. 12 1 None of these
forms of notice, of course, was likely to give actual notice to displaced
homeowners, who were thousands of miles from New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina, that their homes were slated for demolition.
C. Evictionfrom PublicHousing
Tenants who live in public housing or a federally subsidized
apartment complex generally enjoy greater protection against eviction
than most other tenants.

122

However, protections are limited, and hous-

ing authorities who assert that units are unsafe or uninhabitable usually
prevail in removing tenants.

123

Moreover, if public housing is renovated

or revitalized, residents have no constitutional right to remain after re124
vitalization of their residential units.
Many residents who had occupied public housing units were left
with no immediate place of residence. 125 Many tenants fear that units
that remain unoccupied will be gentrified to produce mixed-income
units, thus permanently displacing the former residents. 126 These fears
are well-founded if the previous actions of housing officials are any indication of their future intent. 127 Replacement of older public housing

an assertion that private property was taken for public use without compensation. See id. at
459.
120 See Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 159 F. App'x 235, 237-38 (2d Cir.
2005).
121 SeeJoe Gyan, Jr., N.O. Serves Notice on Property, ADVOCAT (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb.
21, 2006, at Al; Panel Discussion on Race, Rights, and Reconstruction, supra note 42.
12 See Evictions from Certain Subsidized and HUD-Owned Projects, 24 C.F.R. § 247
(2006); Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law that Give
Security of Tenure and Contro 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 681, 732-33 (1994). Generally, eviction
from public housing units must be for "good cause," including but not limited to material
noncompliance with the rental agreement, material failure to carry out obligations under
any state tenancy laws, or certain types of criminal activity. 24 C.F.R. § 247.3 (a).
123 See 24 C.F.R. § 247.5, .10; Green, supranote 122, at 730-34.
124 Reese v. Miami-Dade County, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1301, 1306-09 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
125 Susan Saulny, Residents Clamoringto Come Home to Projects in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2006, at A14.
126 Id.
127 See Andrew Rice, The Suburban Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at
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with mixed-income units has been a major result of a federal program
called Hope VI 128
Hope VI was designed to revitalize the nation's most damaged and
dilapidated public housing.1 29 Envisioned as a "New Urbanism" approach to public housing, Hope VI used a combination of public and
private dollars to underwrite the costs of reconstructing public housing.13 0 The funds provided for the construction of conventional subsidized apartments for low-income families, along with market rate
apartments and private town homes. 131 Across the United States, mixedincome developments were built where public housing devoted to the
poor once stood. 132 As a result of Hope VI, New Orleans residents who
had lived in now-demolished housing projects were "vouchered-out,"
or given Housing Choice (Section 8) vouchers that were often difficult
to use because of the dearth of landlords who choose to accept the subsidies. 133 In the 1990s, the residents of the St. Thomas project in New
128

See id. In 1992, under an annual appropriations act, Congress established the Urban

Revitalization Development program, also known as HOPE VI (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere). Department of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579-81 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v

(2000)).
129
130

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437v(a).
Id. § 1437v(e) (2) (G); Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic

Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REv. 385, 387, 420-22 (2003). For a discussion of the
effects of HOPE VI, see DIANE K. LEVY & DEBORAH R. KAYE, METRO. HoUs. & CMTYs.
CTR., URBAN

INST.,

How

ARE

HOPE VI

FAMILIES

FARING?: INCOME AND

EMPLOYMENT

(Series Policy Brief No. 4, 2004). New Urbanism is a design and planning theory founded
on assertions about the nature and scope of "traditional" American cities. See EMILY TALEN,
NEW URBANISM AND AMERICAN PLANNING: THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES

1-2 (2005). New

Urbanism attempts to bring together the multiple strands of urbanism such as "diversity,
equity, community, connectivity, and the importance of civic and public space." Id. at 2-3.
11Arthur M. Wolfson, Lost in the Rubble: How the Destruction of PublicHousing Fails to Account for the Loss of Community, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 51, 63 (2005).
132 Id.; NAT'L Hous. LAW PROJECT, FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE

HOPE VI

PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 10-11 (2002), available at http://
www.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf [hereinafter FALSE HOPE].
133 E.g., Rhonda Bell, Apartments Scarce for Section 8 Renters, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Or-

leans), June 6, 2000, at BI. In some regions, housing vouchers would provide landlords
with substantially the same rent as rent paid via private funds, but there is a chronic shortage of landlords who will accept the vouchers. See Pindell, supra note 130, at 430-32. As
one commentator writes, "[t]he idea that the availability and quality of housing will be
determined solely by the ability of persons seeking housing to pay rent at market rates...
[t]o a great extent ... is false." Green, supra note 122, at 685. This is the case because often property owners refuse to enter into landlord-tenant relationships based on nonmonetary factors that are not necessarily reflective of economic rationality, such as "racism,
low-income status, family composition, and receipt of public benefits." Id. (citing James A.
Kushner, The FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of FairHousing, 42
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Orleans found themselves "vouchered-out" when their building was
demolished under Hope VI. 134 The St. Thomas project has become the

prototype for the future of public housing in New Orleans, as planners
envision a wide-scale implementation of mixed-use, market-rate developments.

1 35

13 6
Before Hurricane Katrina, Hope VI was slated for termination.
Proponents of the program argue that it has led to the revitalization of
neighborhoods all over the United States and want to see it applied to

the renewal of public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans.

37

Critics of

flaws.' 38

the program point to several
Primarily, the Hope VI plan leaves
many former housing residents without adequate housing. 39 In New
Orleans and beyond, Hope VI, in its zeal to create mixed-use neighborhoods, has ignored the bonds formed among residents of public housing and in so doing has destroyed the sense of community forever. 14°
The offer of vouchers instead of newly renovated housing has been upheld as a permissible government response to the problem of housing
shortages for the poor.141 Unfortunately, even in cases where renovated
VAND. L. REv. 1049, 1050-51 (1989)). For a discussion of "vouchering out" the poor in the
context of post-Katrina New Orleans, see Mike Davis, Gentrifying Disaster,MOTHER JONES,
Oct. 25, 2005, availableat http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2005/10/
gentrifying-disaster.html.
In view of the international human rights norms discussed in later sections of this article, it may be interesting to consider the extent to which Hope VI or similar programs that
require public housing residents to move and that result in gentrification may be viewed as
arbitrarily forced relocation under international norms. See Marco Simons, The Emergence of
a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. Rv. 95, 98-103 (2002).
Forced relocation includes not only the most egregious human rights violations such as
internment in concentration camps, but also "the assertion of control over populations
(especially those of persecuted ethnic minority groups)" and "the relocation of populations out of areas designated for resource exploitation or off of lands that they do not
own." Id. at 104.
134Davis, supra note 133.
135 E.g., Gwen Fiosa, Public HousingStillEmpty, TIMEs-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 9,

2006, at 1; Davis, supra note 133.
'6 See Rob Nelson, FischerLow-Rise Set to Be Razed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb.
28, 2003, at Al (noting that in 2003, "President Bush [sought] to end the 10-year-old federal HOPE VI program, which his administration [said was] riddled with inefficiency and
poor planning by local authorities.").
137 Gwen Fiosa, 4 Housing Complexes Will Be Demolished, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),June 15, 2006, at Al.
138 See generally FALSE HOPE, supra note 132.
139Id. at 7-15. For a further discussion of Hope VI and its impact on communities and

the availability of housing for the poor, see generally Pindell, supra note 130, and Wolfson,
supra note 131.
140 Wolfson, supra note 131, at 69-70.
141Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass'n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 714 (8th Cir.
2003) (finding that even if Congress intended to require HOPE VI grant recipients to
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housing reopens in the same communities, there is no guarantee that
former residents will have access to the new units.142
D. Market Response Eviction from PrivateHousing

Eviction from privately owned housing, or the forced removal from
leased premises by a landlord or his agents, is usually governed by state
and local statutes. 143 In many jurisdictions, landlords may evict tenants at
the end of a lease term without cause, as long as the landlord uses the
144
appropriate legal process and adheres to procedural requirements.
There are some jurisdictions where laws bar all but 'just cause" evictions,
with just cause defined either by the terms of the lease, case law, or a
statute that enumerates permissible reasons for eviction. 145 Louisiana,
however, is not such a jurisdiction. The lack of 'Just cause" regulation
allows for what I have here termed "market response eviction."
By market response eviction, I mean those evictions that take place
in an economic climate wherein it is more economically rewarding for
landlords to evict current tenants and seek new tenants who are able to
pay much higher rates. hi cases where the increase in rent is exorbitant,
this is sometimes referred to as price-gouging. 146 The issue of large rent
increases versus tenant hardship has been described in a number of
jurisdictions as the dilemma between "fair rent," or rents that achieve
long-term equilibrium in landlord returns despite limited supply, and
"forced subsidy," which involves rent control legislation that seems to
place the burden of rental market failures on the landlord. 147 Generally, rent control legislation has been upheld, particularly in times of

provide replacement housing for all displaced tenants, the housing authority met this requirement by offering all displaced tenants Section 8 housing vouchers).
142 See id. at 714-15 (rejecting the contention that a refurbished housing project was
required to provide space for all former tenants).
143 See P. A. Agabin, Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally Entitled to Possession to Dispossess
Tenant Without Legal Process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177, §§ 1, 5 (1966).
144 See id. § 5.
145 See, e.g., NewJersey Anti-Eviction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000).
146 See generally Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and
Economic Aspects of Post-DisasterPrice Regulation, 94 Ky. L.J. 535 (2005-2006); Richard A.
Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory ofEfficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 741 (1988).
147 See, e.g., Timothy L. Collins, "FairRents" or "ForcedSubsidies" Under Rent Regulation:
Finding a Regulatory Taking Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1293, 1294 (1996);
Michael D. Bergman, Recent Development, Property Law: Recent Developments in Rent Control
and Related Laws Regulating the Landlord-TenantRelationship, 1989 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
691, 734-36 (1989).
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emergency shortage.1 48 Since Katrina, over 450 complaints of housingrelated price-gouging have been lodged with the office of Louisiana
Attorney General Charles Foti, Jr. 49 However, because rent-based pricegouging is not covered explicitly by Louisiana law, the Attorney General
has not filed any charges. 150 A bill introduced in the Louisiana legislature is designed to end the practice by making "unfair residential rent
increases" in hurricane-damaged areas illegal. 151
Despite efforts to address the problem of exorbitant rents, the
problem continues over a year after the hurricane. 52 According to data
collected by the Brookings Institution, the fair market value of a twobedroom apartment in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina has risen
by thirty-nine percent, meaning that the average price of a two-bedroom apartment has risen from $676 to $940 per month. 53 This increase in rental price was left largely unameliorated by the actions of
the government. 154 For example, the Louisiana Recovery Authority has
set aside $7.5 billion to help homeowners with property recovery efforts
and $859 million to assist landlords. 155 No funds or economic benefits
have been slated for direct delivery to tenants. 156 Hence, while land-

lords have been able to restore some of their properties and re-rent
them, often at the new, higher rates, tenants whose rental housing was
destroyed have received little funding to find housing in the higher15 7
priced market.

148

See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921) (upholding a rent control ordi-

nance on the theory that World War I had created an economic emergency that "clothed
the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law").
149 Michael Kunzelman, After Katrina, Low-Income Tenants Fight Eviction, MOBILE REGISTER (Ala.), Apr. 19, 2006, atA6.
150 Id.
151 Jake Wagman, Survivors of Katrina Strive to Set Down Roots Nine Months Later, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 2006, at Al.
152 AMy LIU ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SPECIAL EDITION

OF THE KATRINA INDEX:

YEAR REVIEW OF KEY INDICATORS OF RECOVERY IN POST-STORM

NEW ORLEANS

A

ONE-

4 (2006),

availableat http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060822_katrina.pdf.
153 Id. at 4, 5.
154 See Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Renewal Money Bypasses Renters in New Orleans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at 14.
155 Id.
156

Id.

157

See id.
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OTHER BARRIERS TO THE RETURN OF POOR BLACKS TO NEW ORLEANS

A. "Cleaningup the Ghetto": The Conflation of Race and Crime
in Urban Neighborhoods
We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn't do it.
But God did.
-Representative Richard Baker, Republican Congressman from
158
Baton Rouge
One of the significant barriers to the return of poor blacks to New
Orleans is a notion that these persons were undesirable elements in the
community. As one observer suggested, "Ifwe're going to try to recreate the city, why not do it right? Why rebuild it the way it was? New Orleans was a dangerous city even before the hurricane hit."159 Comments
such as these, expressing an open Schadenfreude at the evacuation and

slow return of poor blacks, 160 reflect notions held by many white and
economically well-off New Orleanians-that there is conflation between
race, crime, and urban residency, and that the face of crime in New Orleans is black.

Accordingly, the widespread evacuation of many poor blacks who
previously resided in New Orleans is viewed as the beginning of a "dis-

158 Susan Saulny, Residents Clamoringto Come Home to Projects in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 2006, at A14.
159Haya El Nasser, A New Orleans Like the Old One Just Won't Do, USA TODAY, Sept. 19,
2005, at 15A.
160 "Schadenfreude" is a German word, usually capitalized, signifying a malicious or

perverse pleasure in the misfortune of others. 16

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

611 (2d

ed. 1989). It has been imported to English directly in its German form, as it is often said to
have no true English equivalent. But see PETER NOVOBATZKY & AMMON SHEA, INSULTING
ENGLISH 51 (2001) (defining "epicaricacy," an English word of apparently similar meaning, but appearing in few modern dictionaries). In some of its earliest scholarly usage,
Schadenfreude focused upon considerations of interpersonal relations. See generally FRITZ
HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 127 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1887). In more recent scholarly usage, it has moved
beyond the interpersonal to the broader context of intergroup relations, particularly
where there are feelings of scorn or superiority held by one group towards another, and
for this reason, it has a particular piquancy in the context of some mainstream white attitudes held about poor, black Katrina victims. See Russell Spears & Colin Wayne Leach, Intergroup Schadenfreude: Conditions and Consequences, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF EMoTIONS 336,
336-38 (Larissa Z. Tiedens & Colin Wayne Leach eds., 2004). Spears and Leach argue that
Schadenfreude is an important aspect of group social identity because of the way that it
implies both "psychological distance" from and "emotional divergence" between one group
and another. Id. at 338.
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161
aster dividend," or an unexpected bonus arising from the adversity.
This dividend has helped to hasten the "urban renewal" process that
has been part of the fabric of New Orleans and other American cities
since the 1950s, resulting in such wholesale elimination of communities
of color, especially black communities, that it is often cynically called
"negro removal."1 62
This process of eliminating blacks from the urban fabric reflects
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss' work on societies' response to difference. 163 Lvi-Strauss suggests that societies use two mechanisms for
addressing the "otherness" of Others: anthropoemic (expelling the
Other) or anthropophagic (swallowing or appropriating the Other).164
In primitive societies these devices were often literal and were seen in
the use of exile and cannibalism. 65 Lvi-Strauss argues that these
strategies of domination are mutually exclusive. 166 More recent commentators have viewed the anthropophagic and anthropoemic processes as coexisting mechanisms, which may function at the same time in
societies although they may be in the province of differing institutions
67
or may only be applied to certain segments of the population.

161 See, e.g., Ashok Malik, The DisasterDividend, INDIAN EXPRESS (Mumbai), Oct. 31,
2005, availableat http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/archive full-story.php?contentid=81079 (arguing that the massive October 8, 2005 earthquake in Jammu and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir might have the benefit of helping to bring peace the region). The
disaster dividend may be compared in some respects to the notion of a "peace dividend."
TODD SANDLER & KEITH HARTLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE 277-79 (1995). A peace
dividend refers, in the most basic sense, to the reallocation of spending from military purposes to other budget categories that are perceived as peacetime expenditures. Id. at 277.
It has been noted that this view of the peace dividend is simplistic and fails to take into
account the often complex and slow-moving process of such reallocations. Id. Similarly, a
disaster dividend, while popularly conceived as an almost instantaneous materialization of
a benefit after a disaster or emergency, may in fact be much slower in manifesting itself.
162 Thomas J. Campanella, Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans, 72 J. AM.
PLANNING ASS'N 141, 144 (2006); see also CHARLES C. EUCHNER & STEPHEN J. McGOVERN,
URBAN POLICY RECONSIDERED: DIALOGUES ON THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERI-

101 (2003); DAVID HILFIKER, URBAN INJUSTICE: How GHETTOS HAPPEN 6-11
(2002); Philip M. Hauser & Mary B. Wirth, Relocation-Opportunityor Liability?, in POVERTY
IN AMERICA 349, 360-61 (Margaret S. Gordon ed., 1965).
163 See CLAUDE Ltvi-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES 287-88 (John Weightman & Doreen
Weightman trans., 1992) (1955).
164Zygmunt Bauman, Uses and Disuses of Urban Space, in ORGANIZING METROPOLITAN
SPACE AND DISCOURSE 15, 24 (Barbara Czarniawska & Rolf Solli eds., 2001) (citing LitvICAN CITIES

STRAUSS,
165
166
167

supra note 163).

Id.
See id.
See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIFE IN FRAGMENTS: ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN MORALITY

179-81 (1995);

STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
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These mechanisms are often present in modern society in "upgraded" or "refined" forms via the appropriation of cultural artifacts or
other attributes of the Other, spatial separation, the establishment of
urban ghettos, and measures that make it impracticable for the displaced to return to their former homes.' 68 Indeed, the final mechanism
may be at work in the case of blacks in New Orleans. Yet Hurricane
Kat-ina is not the first time that the dislocation and destruction caused
by a major disaster has driven some dominant white interests to seek
the removal of a community of color.
Probably the best known historical example of a post-disaster effort
to eliminate a community of color was seen in San Francisco's Chinatown following the earthquake of 1906.169 The 1906 earthquake was of
immense proportions, estimated to have been at 8.3 on the Richter
Scale. 170 The earthquake and subsequent fire that it caused damaged
much of the city.171 Chinatown, centrally located on a hill in one of the
prime commercial quarters of San Francisco, was all but destroyed by
the earthquake. 172 City leaders, and even out-of-town critics, immediately reprised attempts from the 1870s to move Chinatown from its central, geographically favorable location to a more marginal neighbor17 3
hood.
In the wake of the destruction caused by the earthquake in San
Francisco, it was argued that the entire neighborhood should be relocated, for the "safety" and "happiness" of the Chinese themselves, and
CLASSIFICATION 218-19, 234 (1985); JocK YOUNG, THE EXCLUSIVE SOCIETY: SOCIAL ExCLUSION, CRIME AND DIFFERENCE IN LATE MODERNITY 56-57 (1999).
168 MAY JOSEPH, NOMADIC IDENTITIES: THE PERFORMANCE OF CITIZENSHIP 131-32
(1999) (discussing "ideological cannibalism" and the way in which postcolonial societies
consume the cultural corpus of Others as an exercise in state-building). Although LviStrauss seemed to see the two impulses as being starkly opposed and viewed "primitive"
societies as anthropoemic and modern societies as anthropophagic, Bauman sees both
impulses in modern society. BAUMAN, supra note 167, at 179-81; Lkvi-STRAuss, supra note

163, at 287-88.
169

See generally PHILIP L.

FRADKIN, THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE AND FIRESTORMS OF

1906:

How SAN FRANCISCO NEARLY DESTROYED ITSELF 289-304 (2005).
170 ANN WEIL, EARTHQUAKES 24 (2004). The Richter magnitude test scale, more
accurately described as the local magnitude ML scale, was developed in 1935 and credited
to Charles Richter. Id. at 4; see Bruce A. Bolt, Engineering Seismology, in EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING: FROM ENGINEERING SEISMOLOGY TO PERFORMANCE-BASED ENGINEERING

2-1, 2-13

to 2-15 (Yousef Bozorgnia & Vitelmo V. Bertero eds., 2004). The scale uses a base ten
logarithmic scale to assign a single number to quantify the size of an earthquake. Bolt,
supra,at 2-13. Approximating tools have allowed scientists to assign the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake a place on the scale. Id.
171 FRADKIN, supra note
172 Id. at 34-35, 289.
173 Id. at 34-37.

169, at 3-4.
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to eliminate the "blight" that Chinatown had caused to the central
city.174 But for the intervention of the Dowager Empress in China, San
Francisco's Chinatown would have been rebuilt on a vastly smaller scale
with fewer inhabitants on the mudflats near the city's slaughterhouses.1 75 Like the Chinese in San Francisco in 1906, the poor blacks in
post-Katrina New Orleans face dispossession and dislocation. 176 Desires
to reduce the number of certain people in order to fight urban blight
or crime stand as one of the most insurmountable barriers to the renewal of neighborhoods chiefly occupied by blacks and especially poor
blacks. 177 Unfortunately, no powerful defender, either in the United
States or abroad, has thus far stepped forward to aid black New Orleanian efforts to reestablish their neighborhoods.
B. The Race, Crime, and UrbanResidency Triad
"Some of the people shouldn't return." . . . "The (public housing) developments were gang-ridden by some of the most notorious gangs in this country. People hid and took care of those persons because they took care of them.
Only the best residents should return. Those who paid rent on time, those
who held a job and those who worked."
-Housing and Urban Development Secretary Alphonso Jackson 178

One of the principal reasons for the undesirability of poor, black
Katrina victims is the belief, expressed by public figures and private actors, of a significant link between the black, mostly poor inhabitants of
New Orleans and high crime rates. 179 Therefore, the story goes, the
evacuation of poor, black areas and the subsequent destruction of housing which make broad reoccupation impossible means a reduction in
crime rate in New Orleans because the "criminals" were cleaned out by
the hurricane. 180 In the aftermath of Katrina, stories abounded of the
174Id. at 294-96.
175 See SIMON WINCHESTER, A CRACK IN THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: AMERICA AND THE
GREAT CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE OF 1906, at 330-31 (2005); JUDY YUNG & THE CHINESE
HISTORICAL SOC'Y OF Am., SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN 43 (2006).
176 See discussion infra Part HL.B-C.
177 See discussion infra Part II.B-C.

178Bill Walsh, OfficialBlunt on PublicHousing,TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 25,

2006, at 1.
179See DYSON, supra note 21, at 114-15. Author Michael Eric Dyson writes that Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, responding to media reports that blacks in many parts of
New Orleans were looting and rioting out of control, authorized National Guard troops to
shoot "hoodlums." Id. at 114.
180In one instance, Councilman Chris Roberts of Jefferson Parish, a town near New
Orleans that was slated to accept a number of families under the federally funded Housing
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criminal propensities and improvidence of these areas' former residents. 1 8 1 The media reported that government or private issue emer-

gency funds were misused to buy expensive toys, other luxury items,
and in some cases drugs. 182 Popular culture in the form of gangsta rap
quickly picked up this strain. In the months following the hurricane,
New Orleans rappers and deejays, exiled to locations all over the
United States, released songs chronicling the events of Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath. 183 In some cases it was not clear whether it
was a case of art imitating life or art imagining life. 84
Choice Voucher Program (formerly Section 8) wanted to legislate a requirement that landlords who accept federal housing subsidies must hire around-the-clock security. Meghan
Gordon, Councilman Takes Back Security Plan, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 27,
2006, at 1. Roberts, as a result of studying incident reports and riding along with local police, concluded that there was a "direct correlation between frequent crime and apartments that the 'government is giving away for free.'" Id. According to the councilman,
"'It's no secret that if you go in New Orleans, the majority of the crime happens in public
housing complexes' ....
'Unfortunately, in Jefferson Parish, they have turned private
apartments into public housing complexes.'" Id. The proposed required security detail, in
Roberts's opinion, would have reduced crime in the parish. Id. Roberts later withdrew the
proposal in the face of criticism that it was discriminatory. Id.
181E.g., Reckdahl, supranote 29.
182 See id.

18 See, e.g., JUVENILE, Get Ya Hustle On, on REALITY CHECK (Atlantic Records 2006);
TENll WARD BUCK, What Is Your FEMA Number?, http://b.rox.com/media/fema-number.

mp3 (transcript available at http://b.rox.com/archives/2006/03/29/what-is-your-femanumber/). One artist sang a paean to the chaos after Katrina:
The loamin hard sparkle like glass
Main bitch right behind me lookin sharp in the Jag
Security say you don't know me so I talk to 'em bad
If a nigga want somethin I got somethin for his ass
Choppers-I'm already knowin that it's a G thang
Ever since they tried to drown a nigga on the eastbank
Everybody need a check from FEMA
So he can go and sco' him some co-ca-in-e
Get money! And I ain't gotta ball in the Beemer
Man I'm tryin to live, I lost it all in Katrina (damn)
And nobody cares what the police thank
Everybody fuckin with ki's cause it's a street thang.
JUVENILE, supra. Yet another rap artist, in his salute to Hurricane Katrina, wrote and performed a song titled What is YourFEMA Number? See Appendix B (providing lyrics as performed by rap artist Tenth Ward Buck).
These artists perform a variant of hip hop music particular to New Orleans called
bounce music. Bounce music is characterized by call and response party chants and dance
call-outs and frequently has an undercurrent of techno-funk sound. It is akin to rap, but
involves "festive beats" and "exuberant chants" yet basic lyrics. Kelefa Sanneh, Gangsta
Gumbo, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2006, at § 2. The chants and sometimes claps are often
interpersed with "shoutouts." Sean Ross, Bounce Music Bounces Back, AIRPLAY MoNrrOR,
Aug. 22, 2003. Though bounce music has not always enjoyed the wide appeal and fame of
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The conflation of poverty, blackness, and urban residency with lawlessness is, writes one observer, one of the results of the so-called War
on Poverty.185 The War on Poverty, rather than addressing the mainstream institutional power arrangements that created and continue to
sustain poverty, treats poverty and its ills as more attributable to internal
factors such as the failings of black individuals and communities. 186 In
this view, poverty in black neighborhoods does not result from widespread, external, and systemic social and political failings but instead is
framed as an internal, localized, episodic, urban, self-generating, and
187
overwhelmingly black problem which "naturally" engenders crime.
This take on race, crime, and poverty is reproduced frequently by
apparently well-meaning observers and even by some members of the
black community.1 88 One commentator, in an effort to spur blacks to
more standard rap or hip hop music, it is critically successful among hip hop enthusiasts in
New Orleans and well beyond, and is increasingly becoming exemplary of New Orleans
music in much the same way that Cajun music once defined the New Orleans sound. The
vibrant eruption of bounce music that addressed Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath is a
hopeful sign that a sound that is part of the unique flavor of black New Orleans which,
now dispersed, may remain undiminished in the absence of New Orleans black residents.
For a more in depth discussion of the above, see generally NM COHN, TRiKSTA: LIFE AND
DEATH AND NEW ORLEANS RAP (2005) and CHERYL L. KEYES, RAP MUSIC AND STREET
CONSCIOUSNESS (2004).
184 See KEITH NEGUS, Music GENRES AND CORPORATE CULTURES 91 (1999); IMANI

PERRY, PROPHETS OF THE HOOD: POLITICS AND POETICS IN Hip Hop 90 (2004). One of the
critiques of the gangsta rap genre is that it not only glorifies actual violence but also imagined violence, and that it thus presents life in ghettos and poor neighborhoods as excessively violent or profane and ultimately not true to reality. See PERRY, supra, at 90. This is
done in order to gain market share and "street cred," or authority as one knowledgeable
about life in poor minority neighborhoods. See id. Many of those involved in songwriting,
production, and often the performance of gangta rap are themselves well-educated products of middle-class homes. See NEGUS, supra, at 91-92. For a discussion of the relationship
between class, race, and rap, see generally ADAM KRIMS, RAP MUSIC AND THE POETICS OF
IDENTITY (2000).
185 STEVEN GREGORY, BLACK CORONA: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 105 (1999).

186 See id.
17 See id.
188 See Juan Williams, Op-Ed., Getting Past Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A17.

Juan Williams writes that one of the biggest barriers to the return of poor blacks to New
Orleans is not lack of government financing to rebuild housing but "poverty of spirit." Id.
Black comedian and recent social critic Bill Cosby, while acknowledging the hardships
suffered by poor, black Katrina survivors, chided survivors for their failures to adequately
parent and the consequent high crime rate in New Orleans before the hurricane. Cosby
Charms, Chastises Crowd, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PREsS,June 12, 2006, at B2.
Scholar Michael Eric Dyson writes that some of the most prominent bashers of the
black urban poor, or what he terms the "ghettocracy," are members of the black middle
and upper middle classes, which he calls the "Afristocracy." MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, IS BILL
COSBY RIGHT?: OR HAS THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS LOST ITS MIND?, at xiii-xiv (2005).
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take greater responsibility for the problem of black crime, decried the
spread of a "cultural illness" in the black community.1 89 This illness
produces sufferers who "don't snitch on criminals, seldom marry, frequently abandon their children, refer to themselves in the vilest terms
(niggers, whores, etc.), spend extraordinary amounts of time kicking
back in correctional institutions, and generally wallow in the deepest
depths of degradation their irresponsible selves can find."1 90 Such accounts subvert and distort the meaning of culture, giving sustenance to
notions such as the "culture of crime." These rhetorical constructions
posit crime as a socially transmitted, wholly voluntary set of traits that
are characteristic of an entire group of people instead of the anomalous perversion of social norms that it is. The ideological sibling of the
culture of crime is the culture of victimhood, based on a "rhetoric of
grievance" and "ressentiment" that become part of a group's "constitutive traits."1 91

These claims about culture in poor, black communities, often

made by persons who are socially and politically outside of those communities, rely on assertions of the inherent neutrality of mainstream
culture and ignore the social, political, and economic contexts of the
people under discussion.1 92 They impose "culture from above" wherein
external forces ascribe to members of a particular group a corrupt,
arid, and perverse form of culture based on the ethnic or racial identity
of the group to which they are presumed to belong. 93 Such claims are

189 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Triumph of Felons and Failure, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at
A27.
190 Id. For a broader discussion of this point of view, see generally JUAN WILLIAMS,
ENOUGH: THE PHONY LEADERS, DEAD-END MOVEMENTS, AND CULTURE OF FAILURE THAT
ARE UNDERMINING BLACK AMERICA-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2006).
191 MICHAEL DORLAND & MAURICE CHARLAND, LAW, RHETORIC, AND IRONY IN THE
FORMATION OF CANADIAN CIVIL CULTURE 18 (2002) (citing RichardJenkyns, Cards of Identity, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 23, 1998, at 49, 50 (reviewing DAVID LOWENTHAL, POSSESSED BY
THE PAST: THE HERITAGE CRUSADE AND THE SPOILS OF HISTORY (1996))). The use of "ressentiment" in this context comes from the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, who defined it
generally as venting the effects of suffering by seeking a cause external to oneself as the
source of that suffering. See Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption

of Character,91 IOWA L. REv. 561, 602-03 (2006). See generally NIETZSCHE, supra note 160.
192 SeeJOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL
EXPLORATION OFJUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS 260-61 (2000).
193 Abebe Zegeye et al., Resisting Ethnicity from Above: Social Identities and Democracy in
South Africa, in DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE REVIEW: MANDELA'S LEGACY 1994-1999, at
151, 152 (Wonne G. Muthien et al. eds., 2000). I derive the expression "culture from
above" from the notion of "ethnicity from above" which has been used to describe the way
in which an empowered minority of persons exercise hegemony via the imposition of politicized racial categories that serve to perpetuate inequality. Id.
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often the morally troubling signal of a fatigue with the problems of
others and an effort to create social distance. 194 In such accounts, innocent, hardworking poor or working-class blacks become peripheral and
are sidelined. When such innocent blacks suffer or fail, they are portrayed as marginal, barely existing victims of the prevailing "criminal"
culture of the black community. When they succeed, which is rare because success is measured in giant steps rather than in small, measured
steps, they are held up as bootstrapping role models to be plucked
from the degradation of the ghetto and cultivated as hothouse flowers
in mainstream white America.
C. "Identity Cleavages" and "Vacuums of Authority"
One observer has suggested that the problems experienced by
persons displaced in a disaster are often the result of or exacerbated by
the "differentiated identities" of the victims. 195 These identities may be

based on a variety of factors such as race, ethnicity, or religion, any one
of which may effectively serve as "identity cleavages."1 96 Identity cleavages sever members of the differentiated group from the dominant
group in a society. 197 When these persons also happen to be members
of a marginalized or disfavored group already in conflict with the
dominant group, the rights of citizenship are rarely filly available to
them during a crisis of displacement. 198 In such a case, displaced persons are not "protected and assisted" as mainstream citizens during a
crisis, but instead are "identified as part of the enemy, neglected and
even persecuted." 199 For these displaced persons, many of the guarantees of civic membership are absent, and citizenship becomes, if not
contested, certainly contingent.20 0 Because they are disconnected from
the enjoyment of the rights normally associated with the dignity of being a citizen, their marginalization "becomes tantamount to statelessness." 20 ' In these cases, there is frequently no governmental authority

Veena Das & Arthur Kleinman, Introduction to

194

VIOLENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY,

supra

note 15, at 1, 4.
195Francis M. Deng, Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Protection, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI., Jan. 2006, at 217, 219. Deng is the author of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, discussed infra Parts IV.C, V.

Id.

196
197

Id.

198 Id.
199Id.
200

See Deng, supra note 195, at 219.

201

Id.
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willing to assume responsibility for the displaced, and thus there is a
202
"vacuum of responsibility" that may be filled by international law.
The dual concepts of identity cleavage and the vacuum of responsibility illuminate certain aspects of the situation facing poor, black
Katrina evacuees. 20 3 Almost immediately after the hurricane, there were
statements disclaiming responsibility for victims by local, state, and federal authorities. 20 4 This response, or rather lack of response, was one of
the hallmarks of the crisis; the government's continual finger pointing
and buck-passing conveyed the extent to which many of Hurricane
Katrina's victims were viewed with contempt.20 5 It was a poignant reminder of the way in which legal and political discourse concerning
people of African ancestry involves an active and continual "othering"
20 6
of blacks, which renders them outsiders.
I have set forth some of the reasons for the displacement and dispossession of poor, black New Orleanians and shown how many of
those barriers are housing related or based on the notion that poor
blacks pose a security risk or are undesirable. I will now turn to possible
remedies for dispossession and focus on how international law may be a
source of a domestic right of return.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
HURRICANE KATRINA

A. An Overview of the Development of InternationalLaw as a Source of Rights

The word "rights" carries great weight and raises expectations.
Rights are entitlements, rights are freedoms, and ultimately, in all cases,
rights are power. While the notion of rights has certainly been at the
heart of most Western legal and social systems, rights have not necessarily been expressed in positive terms. 20 7 Historically, rather, the rights

that guided and shaped the day-to-day lives of persons living in Western
202 Id.

See id.
See DYSON, supra note 21, at 54-76. Author Michael Eric Dyson describes the extent
to which the hurricane, though anticipated by officials and various levels of government,
was all but ignored both before and immediately after it struck. See id.; see also BRINKLEY,
supra note 5, at 56.
205 See DYSON, supra note 21, at 54-76.
206 See Nicholas B. Dirks, Introductionto COLONIALISM AND CULTURE 1, 7-9 (Nicholas B.
Dirks ed., 1992).
207 E.g., Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, ConstitutionalRopes of Sand orJusticiableGuarantees?: Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 71 (1992)
("[M] any classical rights are often imagined in all but exclusively negative terms ... ").
203
204
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societies were often subtle, implicit, and not necessarily recorded. It has
been argued, for example, that early peoples living in protogovernment societies lived by social contract.20 8 These contracts were
implicit agreements whereby each person understood that in order to
receive rights, they had to perform some duty in return. 2 °9 With the
development of nation-states, the contractual aspect of rights became
one wherein the exchange was between the individual and a sovereign
leader.2 10 Social contract theory offered an account of social and political relationships within the nation-state and ultimately of rights themselves. 21 ' However, for the most part, social contract theory as it was ini-

tially conceived left the international arena, those spaces external to
the individual nation-state, relatively undefined.2 12 In these interstitial
spaces between nations, there was no fixed legal framework or international sovereign, and nations existed in a "state of nature" wherein
213
there was always the specter of war.

Though modern nations have historically filled the void outside of
the nation-state, some would argue that we are still in a state of nature
regarding laws that govern international relations. 2 14 Such laws, though
perhaps more nuanced and refined than in past centuries, are still only
provisionally valid. 215 Nonetheless, there has long been a wellunderstood system of laws and norms that govern international relationships, including both customary laws and basic forms of conventional law.216 Since the period after World War I, however, there has
208 SeeJill Stauffer, The Fiction of the State of Nature in Real Time: The Social Contract, International Human Rights and the Refugee, in CRITICAL BEINGS: LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL

SUBJECT 3, 3-4 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004) (encapsulating the theories
of Thomas Hobbes).
2o9 Id.at 5.
210 See id. at 5-6.

21 See id.at 4.
212 See id. at 3-4. For a broad discussion of the development of international law, see

generally WILHEM G.

GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans.,
rev. ed. 2000) (1984).
213 See Stauffer, supra note 208, at 3-4.
214

See id.

215 SeeJuRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 168-69 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., Ciaran Cronin trans., 1998).

216 See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNA3-4 (1999) (describing customary international law as law governing the relationships between and among nations that
have arisen from custom and usage, and recognized and accepted as binding even though
not codified); H. VICTOR CONDf, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY 26 (2d ed. 2004) (1999) (describing conventional international law as referring
to formal agreements between or among nations that are found in covenants, conventions,
charter pacts, statutes, protocols, or other similar instruments).
TIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Boston College Third World Law Journal

[Vol. 27:325

been an intensive focus on formalizing the process of developing international law by coalitions of governments. 2 17 The idea was to form a
"government of governments," and international law, rather than evolving only as the need arose, became the subject of continuous contemplation by international bodies created solely for this purpose. 218 These
bodies create rules which ideally have a legitimizing and constraining
effect upon both the international and intra-national behavior of
member nations. 219 It is within this framework of international law that
the notion of international human rights has developed.
B. The InternationalBill of Human Rights

International human rights are a foundational aspect of more
general international law norms. 220 The language used in the Preamble

of the Charter of the United Nations, the constitution of the United
Nations whose provisions are paramount to all other treaties, supports
this view. 221 The Preamble states that "the Peoples of the United Nations [are] determined ...

to reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental

human rights."222 However, one query arising in a discussion of the
concept of international human rights is whether they are "rights" at all

217

See

MARK

E.

VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES:

A MANUAL

69-74 (2d ed. 1997)
(1985). There have long been private attempts to codify of the law of nations. Id. at 65-67.
These were undertaken by a diverse group of private individuals. Id. at 65-66. Among
these private drafters were Jeremy Bentham and David Dudley Field, the drafter of the
Field Code. Id. at 65. Some private organizations that undertook the codification of international law included entities such as the International Law Association and the Institut de
DroitInternational Id. at 66-67.
218 See generally 3 AKIRA IRIYE, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELAON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES

1913-1945, at 62-68, 205, 209-13 (1993). One of
the earliest efforts was the League of Nations. Franz Cede, Historicaland Legal Frameworkfor
Activities of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 3, 3 (Franz
Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann eds., 2001). The League of Nations was the first international intergovernmental organization. Id. at 3-4. It was formed after World War I to
promote international cooperation among nations and to achieve peace. Id. at 3. It functioned from 1920 until it was dissolved in 1946, after World War II. See id. at 5. Out of the
League of Nations grew the United Nations, which was created in 1945 as another international rule-making body. Id. at 6-7. The United Nations has 192 member states, which
includes most internationally recognized independent nations. See United Nations, United
Nations Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
219 BYERS, supra note 216, at 6-7.
TIONS: THE GLOBALIZING OF AMERICA,

220 Id.

221 See U.N. Charter pmbl.; Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 461, 462 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol6/No3/art9.pdf.
222 U.N. Charter, supra note 221, pmbl.; van Boven, supra note 221, at 462.
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Nonetheless, norms for in-

ternational human rights are clearly a well-entrenched part of interna224
tional law.

Though international human rights have developed from a number of sources and over a long period of time, the International Bill of
Rights presents a comprehensive normative framework. 225 It encompasses several instruments, including: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 226 Within some of these

instruments, support for a domestic right of return may be found for
displaced Katrina victims.
C. InternationalHuman Rights, HurricaneKatrina and the Right of Return
The right to return is hollow without a planfor transportationand a place
to stay.

-Rev. Jesse Jackson, speaking at a news conference at the site of
227
the now famous levee breach on the Industrial Canal
Invoking international human rights norms in the domestic context is not a novel idea, and the use of international human rights law
in United States domestic cases is increasing. 228 With this heightened
223 See LouIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 31-33 (1990); MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE IDEA

48-56 (1998).
224 See HENKIN, supra note 223, at ix.
225 See id. at 1-2 (describing the evolution of the contemporary notion of human
rights); van Boven, supra note 221, at 463 (describing the International Bill of Human
Rights).
226 See PERRY, supra note 184, at 12; van Boven, supra note 221, at 463; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Mi), U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Fact
Sheet No.2. (Rev.1), The International Bill of Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/
2/fs2.htm.
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES

227 Bruce Nolan, Jackson: Housing Key to 'Right of Return, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Or-

leans),Jan. 31, 2006, at 8.
228 See Catherine Albisa & Sharda Sekaran, Foreword, Realizing Domestic Social Justice
Through InternationalHuman Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 353-54, 354
n.10 (2006) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) and Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003), and noting that the Court cited international practices in these
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focus on the benefits of international law in domestic contexts, it is

progressively clearer that there are few detailed international standards
for disaster relief and prevention and that development of such standards must take into account the role of both international and domes229
tic actors.
To the extent that there are existing international law norms to
address disasters and the problems of those affected by them, few of
these norms were followed after Hurricane Katrina. For example, a
number of activists and NGOs have cited much of the chaos and deprivation occurring in the wake of Katrina, and the way in which those
deprivations were disproportionately suffered by poor blacks, as an indictment of the U.S. government's clear violations of sections of the

opinions to strike down the juvenile death penalty and an anti-sodomy law, respectively).
For an extensive listing of primary documents and an in-depth discussion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in general and of the application of socio-economic rights in the U.S. context, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS (Jeanne M. Woods & Hope
Lewis eds., 2004).
229 See Jonathan Todres & Pamela L. Marcogliese, InternationalHealth Law, 39 INT'L
LAw. 503, 515-16 (2005); David P. Fidler, The Indian Ocean Tsunami and InternationalLaw,
Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS, Jan. 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/20O5/01/insight

050118.htm. In January 2005, the United Nations sponsored the World Conference on
Disaster Reduction, where delegates considered whether and how international law could
be developed to more fully address the global impact of natural disasters. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Japan,Jan. 18-22, 2005, Report of the World Conference on
DisasterReduction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.206/6 (Mar. 16, 2005) [hereinafter WCDR Report];
Todres and Marcogliese, supra, at 515-16. One of the outcomes of the conference was the
Hyogo Declaration, a statement emphasizing the importance of internationally coordinated disaster reduction. WCDR Report, supra, ch. I, resolution 1. The Hyogo Declaration,
in addition to articulating an intention to build upon international commitments and
frameworks, also acknowledged the important role that domestic governments must play
in disaster response. Id. The Declaration explained that "States have the primary responsibility to protect the people and property on their territory from hazards, and ...to give
high priority to disaster risk reduction in national policy, consistent with their capacities
and the resources available to them." Id.
Consider also the work of the International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) program, a project sponsored by the International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. INT'L FED'N OF THE RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT
Soc'"s., IDRL APPEAL 2006-2007, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/
idrl/idrl-ga0607-revised.pdf. The IDRL program seeks to "raise awareness about ... and to
strengthen the international, regional and national frameworks of laws, rules and principles" so as to circumvent the operational challenges of disaster relief, and to "enable requested international aid to be delivered as efficiently and effectively as possible." Id. at 56. The chief goal of the IDRL project is "to identify how the response to international disasters could be improved through changes in both national and international law." Todres
& Marcogliese, supra, at 515.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

230

363

Moreover, it has

been observed that victims of Hurricane Katrina might be better served
if the United States incorporated the socioeconomic rights of interna231
tional law into its domestic regime.
One way of deploying international human rights norms in the
context of Katrina would be to apply explicit international norms re232
garding what could effectively be called a "domestic right of return."
Such norms are found in the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement. 233 Protections for the internally displaced are also detailed in the
London Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (London Declaration).234 I will forgo discussion of the
230 See Human Rights Comm., Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties UnderArtick 40 of the Covenant: InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States ofAmerica, 1 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/
CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (discussing race and poverty-related concerns associated with
Katrina); The Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, Report of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty on his
Mission to the United States of America (24 October to 4 November 2005), 1 43-58, delivered to the
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006); OXFAM
AM., RECOVERING STATES? THE GULF COAST SIX MONTHS AFTER THE STORMS (Oxfam
Briefing Paper No. 4, 2006), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/briefingpapers/recoveringstates/oabriefngpaper-04_FINAL.pdf;
Press
Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Evaluation of Human Rights in the Americas During IACHR Regular Sessions, No. 07/06 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.
cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2006/7.06eng.htm; Press Release, Nat'l Econ. & Soc.
Rights Council, NESRI Statement: FEMA Hotel Evictions Violate Human Rights (Mar.
2006), http://www.nesri.org/media-updates/fema -hotel -evictions.html; Letter from Judith Brown et al. to Santiago A. Canton, Executive Sec'y, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human
Rights (Jan. 17, 2006) (requesting hearing regarding human rights impact of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita), http://www.nilc.org/disaster-assistance/iachr-hearingrequesdtr_20061-17.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Human Rights Network, U.S. Human Rights Network Presents
Report on Katrina Abuses to U.N. Committee (July 11, 2006), available at http://www.
ushrnetwork.org/pubs/USHRN%20release%20on%20ICCPR%20hearings.pdf;
Statement
ofJeanne M. Woods, Henry F. Bonura Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Sch. of
Law, and Hope Lewis, Professor of Law and Faculty Director of Program on Human Rights
and the Global Economy, Northeastern Univ. Sch. of Law, prepared for the Hearings of
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, Dr. Arjun Sengupta, on the
Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.slaw.neu.edu/clinics/Woods
Lewis.pdf.
231 See generally Phillip A. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights,
39 AKRON L. REv. 417 (2006).
232 See Representative of the Sec'y-Gen., Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement, § 5,
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11,
1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
233 See id.
234 INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 69TH CONFERENCE 794-822 (2000). For a discussion of the London Declaration, see Luke T. Lee, The London Declaration of International
Law Principleson InternallyDisplaced Persons,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 454 (2001).
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London Declaration in favor of a fuller discussion of the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement. First, I will discuss the right of return
in international law as it applies to movements between nation states,
and then I will discuss the norms for internal displacement.
V.

THE RIGHT OF RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The Right of Return in General
The right of return is a concept in international law that allows for
repatriation to a country of origin by former citizens or their descendants. 23 5 In some right of return regimes, the claimants may have no

clearly articulated claim to descent from former citizens of a country;
in such cases the right of return is offered based on generalized racial,
religious, or ethnic background of the claimant. 236 The right of return
typically presumes that right holders will have access to all of the rights
237
held by other citizens of a particular country.
B. The Relationship Between the Right of Return and the Right to Abode
As the phrase is commonly understood, the right to abode, sometimes stated as the right of abode, refers to the right of a person to remain indefinitely in a country without seeking explicit permission from
the government. It is most often associated with citizenship or permanent residency rights, though holders of the right of abode need not
have the full panoply of rights granted to citizens. 238 Typically, individual nations make their own laws and norms regarding such issues as
235 See, e.g., Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under InternationalLaw FollowingMass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?,19 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1091, 1095 & n.17 (1998).
236 See, e.g., Ayelet Sachar, Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 386, 394-96 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000). One example is Israel's Right of Return for

persons of Jewish ancestry. Id. The Israeli Right of Return, however, exists in stark contrast
to the claims to a right of return made by former Palestinian residents of the same geographical territory. See Salman Abu Sitta, The Implementation of the Right of Return, in THE

299, 299 (Roane Carey ed., 2001). A more
recent example is Ghana's creation of a right of return (or right of abode as it is interchangeably called), which would allow U.S. citizens of African ancestry the right to live
and work in Ghana as permanent residents, but would not necessarily confer any right to
political participation. See GODFREY MWAKIKAGILE, RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICANS AND
AFRICAN AMERICANS: MISCONCEPTIONS, MYTHS AND REALITIES 353-56 (2d ed. 2006).
237 See, e.g., GuidingPrinciples, supra note 232, § 1, Principle 1, 1 1; id. § 5, Principle 28,
NEW INTIFADA: RESISTING ISRAEL'S APARTHEID

1.
238

See A.C. Evans, European Citizenship:A Novel Concept in EEC Law, 32 Am. J. ComP. L.

679, 679-80 (1984).
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citizenship and permissions to enter or remain. 239 A frequently cited
example is the right of abode granted to some Hong Kong residents by
Great Britain .240
C. The Source of Normative Law Supporting the Right of Return

Countries that grant a right of return do so under the authority of
their own national laws. However, there are also a number of international human rights instruments that address the freedom of movement as well as the right of return. 241 For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that "[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each State.... Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country."242 While the UDHR does not
have the force of law, it is a guiding document which "set up a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." 243 The UDHR
has been described as ranking with the Magna Carta, the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the American
244
Declaration of Independence.
The provisions of the UDHR were rearticulated in two treaties
drafted in 1966 and put into effect in 1976.245 The first is the Interna-

tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).246 The other is
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

See id.
British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1990, ch. 34, § 1, sched. 1 (Eng.).
241 E.g., UDHR, supra note 226, art. 13; ICCPR, supra note 226, art. 12; African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12, 21 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1982); American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 22, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
504 (Ian Brownlie ed. 3d ed., 1992); Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights, arts. 2-3, May 12, 1968, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra, at 347; Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982). For other examples and for further discussion of the right to movement, see PAUL
SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 174-88 (1983).
242 UDHR, supra note 226, art. 13.
243 Eleanor Roosevelt, quoted in Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of InternationalHuman Rights Norms into Domestic Practices:Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 1 (Thomas Risse et al. eds.,
1999).
244 Thomas Buergenthal, Centerpiece of the Human Rights Revolution, in REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY
91, 91 (Barend Van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Le eds., 1998).
239
240

245 See ICCPR, supra note 226; ICESCR, supra note 226.
2

46 ICCPR, supra note 226.
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(ICESCR)

The two treaties effectively bifurcated the types of rights

247

248
that were being articulated in the UDHR.

Because the UDHR encompasses a wide range of rights that go well
beyond political and civil rights and into the realm of social, economic,
and cultural rights, it could not garner the international consensus
necessary to become a binding treaty.2 49 In particular, a divide

developed between some western industrialized nations with capitalist
economic systems, such as the United States, and countries with socialist
or

mixed

economies.

250

Capitalist

countries

generally

favored

guaranteeing only civil and political rights, or what are known as first
generation rights, while socialist nations favored guaranteeing only
25 1
economic, social, and cultural rights, or second generation rights.

The dispute was solved by the development of the two separate treaties,
the ICCPR and ICESCR, to which nations acceded according to their
252
particular philosophies.
The U.S. Senate ratified the ICCPR in 1992, with a number of
reservations, understandings, and declarations. 253 On June 4, 1992,
254
President George H. W. Bush signed the instrument of ratification.
The Senate declared that "the provisions of Article 1 through 26 of the
Covenant are not self-executing." 255 Therefore, the ICCPR did not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts and hence was of no
authoritative value in domestic situations. 256 However, even if there
were such a cause of action, and particularly applying the provisions on
internal freedom of movement and even analogizing the right to
return, the problem still remains that these rights encapsulated in the
ICESCR, supra note 226.
See ICCPR, supra note 226; ICESCR, supra note 226; UDHR, supra note 226.
249 SeeJames Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 261, 275-78 (2002) (discussing some of the criticisms of the ICESCR).
247
248

250

See DIANA G.

ZOELLE, GLOBALIZING CONCERN FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: TIIE

FAILURE OF THE AMERICAN MODEL 81 (2000). It has been suggested that the ICESCR is

problematic from a capitalist perspective because it raises the specter of global redistribution and concerns itself with a global society rather than a global market. Id. at 79-80.
251 Id. at 80-81.
252 See id. at 80-82.
253 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
254 White House Statement on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1 PUB. PAPERS 901 (June 5, 1992).
255

138 CONG.

256

Id.; see S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15 (1992). Where a treaty or covenant is not

REC.

S4784.

self-executing, and where Congress has not acted to implement the agreement with
legislation, no private right of action is created by ratification. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d
617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952); see Buell x Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370-76 (6th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the relationship between ICCPR and the death penalty).
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ICCPR do not place explicit duty upon the government to ensure that
conditions are such that evacuees have the tools they need to fully
reestablish themselves, much less that conditions would permit their
presence.2 57 Can the ICCPR, even if applicable, place a duty on the
government?
The ICCPR includes a right of return, along with provisions on
the right of free internal movement in Article 12:
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public),
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
8
own country.25
Whether this provision supports a domestic right of return is not clear
from its terms alone. 259 To bridge this gap, the United Nations acted to
2 60
create more explicit standards.
VI. A

"DOMESTIC RIGHT OF RETuRN"? THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Though the victims of Hurricane Katrina who fled their homes
were frequently referred to as "refugees," they are not, of course, refugees in the common meaning of the word. 261 Therefore, such persons
may not rely on international provisions referring to refugees or other
externally displaced persons. 262 Even though they are not "refugees,"
for the period immediately after the hurricane and in some cases much
257 See CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 236-37 (2000).
258 ICCPR, supra note 226, art. 12.
259 See id.
260See discussion infra Part VI.

261See Frederic L. Kirgis, Hurricane Katrina and Internally Displaced Persons, AM. Soc'v
INT'L L. INSIGHTS, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/09/insights050921.

html; cf CONDt, supra note 216, at 125 (defining "refugee" as persons who have fled their
country to avoid persecution).
262See Kirgis, supra note 261.
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longer, many of them found themselves in the same material conditions
as refugees-bereft of home, family, and friends, while lacking basic
necessities.

263

Katrina evacuees are thus more similar to internally dis-

placed persons within the meaning of the 1998 Guiding Principles on
264
Internal Displacement.
No specific treaty protects the rights of persons displaced within
their own national borders by natural disasters or other causes.

265

To

address this void, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
prepared a set of guidelines to be used in cases of internal displacement. 266 The resulting document, the Guiding Principles on Internal

Displacement (Guiding Principles), sets forth thirty principles detailing
international laws that protect the human rights of internally displaced
persons. 267 The Guiding Principles outline the scope and purpose of
the document and state general principles for ensuring humanitarian
assistance. 268 They also describe procedures for three phases of internal
displacement: pre-displacement; displacement; and return, resettlement, and reintegration. 269 While the Guiding Principles have not been

263

See id. For a discussion of the distinction between refugees and internally displaced

persons, see CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DisPLACED PERSONS 13-37 (2005). Phuong considers whether the exclusion of the internally
displaced from the refugee category is justified, and concludes that the distinction should
remain in place. Id. at 37. It has been argued by the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees that "internally displaced persons are persons who would be refugees had they
left their country," and that hence the distinction between the two is so narrow as to not
constitute a substantive difference. Id. at 29 (citing Representative of the Sec'y-Gen., Comprehensive Study Prepared by Mr FrancisM. Deng, Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon
the Human Rights Issues Related to Internally DisplacedPersons Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/73, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1993/35 (Jan. 21, 1993) and Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Div.
of Int'l Protection, UNHCR's OperationalExperience with Internally Displaced Persons (Sept.
1994)).
264 See Guiding Principles,supra note 232, at intro.
2. For a general discussion of internal displacement, see Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James A. R. Nafziger, United States Migration Law: Essentialsfor Comparison, 54 AM.J. Comp. L. 531 (Supp. 2006) and Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to Be Displaced,9AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 689 (2004).
265 Stavropoulou, supra note 264, at 735.
266 Comm'n on Human Rights, Res. 1996/52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1996/52 (Apr.
19, 1996) (calling "upon the Representative of the Secretary-General to continue, on the
basis of his compilation and analysis of legal norms, to develop an appropriate framework
in this regard for the protection of internally displaced persons.").
267 See GuidingPrinciples,supra note 232.
2- See id. §§ 1, 4.
269 See id. §§ 2, 3, 5.
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explicitly incorporated in any treaty, they have been accorded recogni270
tion by United Nations member states.
The Guiding Principles describe individuals, such as the exiled
Katrina survivors, as:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence,
in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who
have not crossed an internationally recognized [international]
271
State border.
Guiding Principle 28(1) effectively creates a domestic right of return
for internally displaced persons by charging states with the "primary
duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the
means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily,
in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. 272 Principle 29(2) further details the duties of states to effectuate the return of
displaced persons in such matters, stating:
Competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to
assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons
to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon
their displacement. When recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or
assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or
2 73
another form of just reparation.
270 See G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 132, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A- Res. 58/
177, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/177 (Dec. 22, 2003). On December 22, 2003 the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution "[r]ecalling the relevant norms of international human
rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law, and recognizing
that the protection of internally displaced persons has been strengthened by identifying,
reaffirming and consolidating specific standards for their protection, in particular through
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement." G.A. Res. 58/177, supra, pmbl. The
United Nations General Assembly also explicitly recognized the Guiding Principles in
adopting the 2005 World Summit Outcome, stating, "We recognize the Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement as an important international framework for the protection of
internally displaced persons." G.A. Res. 60/1, supra, 1 132 (footnote omitted).
271 GuidingPrinciples,supra note 232, intro. 1 2.
272 Id. § 5, Principle 28, 1 1.
273 Id. § 5, Principle 29, 1 2.
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One significant caveat to the use of the Guiding Principles is that
they do not have the force or effect of a treaty and therefore it can be
argued that they are only advisory in nature. 274 However, as one commentator has observed, despite their non-binding status and relatively
recent creation as an international norm, they have frequently been
cited by countries addressing problems of internal displacement.2 75 In
addition, several countries have added provisions modeled on the
Guiding Principles to their domestic laws. 276 Regional organizations
have also made use of the principles. 277 Perhaps surprisingly, even some
"non-state actors," as rebel army groups are sometimes called, have begun to employ the Guiding Principles. 278 Finally, even without having
the force of law, the Guiding Principles may be significant tools in helping governments develop their own legal standards because the Guiding Principles offer "an authoritative statement of the rights of the in279
ternally displaced in one document.'"
It is clear that the Guiding Principles, if applied to the evacuees of
New Orleans, would provide the numerous poor, black victims of Hurricane Katrina the basic, yet currently non-existent, right to return to
274

See

ROBERTA COHEN

&

FRANCIS

M.

DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS

OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 73-76 (1998).
275 Hannah Entwisle, Tracing Cascades:

The Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 369, 370-71 (2005).
276 Id. at 371. "Colombia, Uganda, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia have adopted, or are in
the process of adopting, the GuidingPrinciples, in various forms, into their domestic legal
systems." Id.
277 Francis Deng, InternationalResponse to Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making, Hum. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2004, at 24, 25. Some regional organizations who have employed the Guiding Principles in their work or have further encouraged their dissemination are the Organization of African Unity Commission on Refugees, the Economic
Community of West African States, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly. Id.
278 Id. One example of such a non-state actor that has addressed the Guiding Principles is "the Sudan's Peoples Liberation Movement/Army, which has referred to them in its
consideration of its own internal rule-making on dealing with the internally displaced." Id.
A "non-state actor" is any social actor that is not a recognized state but may in some
contexts have the authority of a state. See Richard Desgagn6, European Union Practice in the
Field of International HumanitarianLaw: An Overview, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: DISCORD OR HARMONY? 455, 461-63 (Vincent Kronenberger ed., 2001). Although traditionally only states were held responsible for human rights
violations, there is a trend towards also making non-state actors accountable. Id. Non-state
actors are generally divided into two principle types: private sector corporate actors such as
multinational and transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations. Richard A. Higgott et al., Introduction: Globalisation and Non-State Actors to NON-STATE ACTORS
AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 1, 1-2 (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds., 2000).
279 COHEN

& DENG, supra note 274, at 76.
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their homes. Though no such binding authority currently exists providing this basic human right, it is certainly a goal that our country and its
internal localities should adopt to prevent the permanent dislocation
of peoples from their homes due to natural disaster, subsequent government coercion, or culturally tainted removal as in the current case
of New Orleans.
CONCLUSION

Using international human rights as the source of a domestic right
of return for poor, black New Orleanians may result in the beginning
of the kind of broad-based restorative justice that black people in the
United States have lacked since their emancipation from slavery. A domestic right of return in this circumstance, however, would impact well
more than just the immediate victims. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, New Orleans is enmeshed in plans for a renaissance which includes a focus on economic revitalization and gentrification. This twopronged focus may cause the city to forget Katrina's poor, black victims
who are already disenfranchised by the unfolding drama. New Orleans's vitality arises from the existence and affirmation of its black
community and its unique culture and contributions; any attempt to
recreate New Orleans without this vital group would result in a sterile
imitation of the city that once was.
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A

I ain't saying he's a gold digger
But he ain't messing with no broke niggas[Repeat once]
George Bush don't like black people [Repeat four times]
Hurricane came through, fticked us up 'round here
Government acting like it's bad luck down here
All I know is that you better bring some trucks 'round here
Wonder why I got my middle finger up 'round here
People lives on the line you declining to help
Since you taking so much time we surviving ourself
Just me and my pets, and my kids, and my spouse
Trapped in my own house looking for a way out
Five damn days, five long days
And at the end of the fifth he walking in like "Hey!"
Chilling on his vacation sitting patienfly
Them black folks gotta hope, gotta wait and see
If FEMA really comes through in an emergency
But nobody seem to have a sense of urgency
Now the mayor's been reduced to crying
I guess Bush said, "Niggas been used to dying! "2 80

280 THE LEGENDARY KO., supranote 21 (transcript available at http://www.nathanielturner.
com/lyricstogeorgebushdoesntcare.htm).
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B

Wat is yo FEMA numba?(FEMA) (huh?)
Yo FEMA numba (who?)
Wat is yo FEMA numba? (FEMA) (huh?)
Yo FEMA numba (who?)
Wat is yo FEMA numba? (FEMA) (huh?)
Yo FEMA numba (who?)
I think it start wit 9
I think it start wit 3
off the phone till you give me me
I
ain't
gettin'
Look
Man I walked through the flood wit these shoes on my feet
And I need a fresh pair give me my 23
So I can walk to the conda store
Spend up the 23 so I can ask for more
I smoke, I roll, I gamble, I save
But I don't know how I got broke in 2 days
I'm lose and I'm low
FEMA drop by and give me 50 more (oh)
Red Cross came thru and gave me a couch
Now I'm at the town getting golds in my mouth
93105 wit the dash
That's my FEMA numba so gimme my cash
I'm headed to the mall, shop at all the stores
Don't matter if I go broke you betta get yours
You see I'm the CEO I just want you to know
When I got my FEMA check baby I went bazerc
I got golds and rims and all the tims
I got a house wit my voucher from the disaster shelter
Drop and give me 50
23, 50
Please FEMA give me
Wat you got to give me
I need some more
So I can go
281
To the shoppin center and buy some more clothes.

281 TENTH WARD BUCK,

supra note 183.

